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A SUBSTANTIVE RIGHT TO CLASS
PROCEEDINGS: THE FALSE CONFLICT
BETWEEN THE FAA AND NLRA
Michael D. Schwartz*
In recent decades, the U.S. Supreme Court’s Federal Arbitration Act
jurisprudence has greatly expanded the scope of enforceable arbitration
agreements. In AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, decided in 2011, the
Court held that a class arbitration waiver in a consumer contract was
enforceable, despite state law to the contrary. In January 2012, the
National Labor Relations Board ruled that, despite the Court’s holding in
Concepcion, class waivers in employment arbitration agreements are
unenforceable due to employees’ right under the National Labor Relations
Act to engage in concerted activity. However, nearly all federal and state
courts that have subsequently considered this question have declined to
follow the NLRB and have enforced similar class waivers.
This Note argues that the NLRB was correct in declaring unenforceable
class waivers in employment arbitration agreements. It concludes that
because employees’ right to invoke class proceedings under the NLRA is a
substantive rather than procedural right, the unwaivability of this right
creates no conflict with the FAA, even under the Supreme Court’s broad
interpretation of the statute.
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INTRODUCTION
The Federal Arbitration Act1 (FAA) makes contractual agreements to
arbitrate, with limited exception, “valid, irrevocable, and enforceable.”2 In
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion,3 the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that a
consumer arbitration agreement requiring that claims be brought in the
parties’ “individual capacity, and not as a plaintiff or class member in any
purported class or representative proceeding,”4 was enforceable under the
FAA.5 Further, the Court invalidated a California law that rendered such
terms in an adhesion contract unconscionable.6 Because the Court enforced
the agreement as written, the plaintiffs were barred from invoking classwide
proceedings, whether in litigation or arbitration.
Concepcion seemingly opened the door for employers to structure their
arbitration agreements, which currently cover millions of employees,7 to
1. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–14 (2006).
2. Id. § 2.
3. 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
4. Id. at 1744.
5. Id. at 1753.
6. Id.
7. At least thirty million employees work under employment contracts containing
arbitration agreements. Nantiya Ruan, What’s Left To Remedy Wage Theft? How Arbitration
Mandates that Bar Class Actions Impact Low-Wage Workers 22 (Univ. of Denver Sturm
Coll. of Law, Working Paper No. 12-36, 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=
2159963.
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exclude the use of class proceedings for the resolution of all future
disputes.8 Recently, however, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB)
ruled that employees’ right under the National Labor Relations Act9
(NLRA) “to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection”10 includes an
unwaivable, substantive right to utilize classwide procedures to resolve
employment disputes.11
The question, then, is how to reconcile the NLRA’s guarantee of
employees’ right to invoke classwide proceedings with Concepcion’s
requirement of enforcing arbitration agreements that waive this right. Put
another way: is an arbitration agreement that precludes classwide
procedures in an employment action enforceable?
This Note addresses the enforceability of class waivers in employment
arbitration agreements. It argues that the NLRA’s protection of concerted
activities, which includes the right to invoke classwide proceedings, renders
such waivers unenforceable, because employees’ right to pursue concerted
activity is a substantive right that cannot be waived in an arbitration
agreement, not a procedural right that can properly be restricted in an
arbitration agreement.12 The NLRB correctly reached this result, but its
diffuse reasoning failed to home in on the critical distinction between
substantive and procedural rights. Courts that have addressed this question,
many of which hold class waivers enforceable, have also largely ignored
this essential analysis.
This Note aims to fill that void and explain why the right to invoke
classwide proceedings, while correctly viewed as a procedural right in other
contexts, is nonetheless a substantive right in the context of employment
contracts governed by the NLRA. This analysis is necessary to understand
why the NLRA does not conflict with the FAA, the primary concern of the
numerous courts that enforced class waivers.

8. See Kevin B. Leblang & Robert N. Holtzman, Waivers of Class and Collective
Claims in Arbitration Agreements: Recent Developments, METRO. CORP. COUNS., Nov.
2012, at 22 (“[I]t seems beyond dispute that the Supreme Court has been giving clear
guidance that employers entering into arbitration agreements with their employees were
permitted to include class and collective arbitration waivers in their agreements.”).
9. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (2006).
10. Id. § 157.
11. D.R. Horton, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. No. 184, 2012 WL 36274, at *4 (Jan. 3, 2012). The
case is currently on appeal to the Fifth Circuit. D.R. Horton v. NLRB, No. 12-60031 (5th
Cir. argued Feb. 5, 2013).
12. This Note’s thesis should not be confused with the argument that class waivers are
invalid where class proceedings are necessary to vindicate a statutory right. The Supreme
Court is currently hearing an appeal on this issue in American Express Co. v. Italian Colors
Restaurant. In re Am. Express Merchants’ Litig., 667 F.3d 204 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. granted,
133 S. Ct. 594 (Nov. 9, 2012) (No. 12-133). In the case below, the Second Circuit held that
a class waiver is unenforceable where “the practical effect of enforcement would be to
preclude [plaintiffs’] ability to vindicate their federal statutory rights.” Id. at 212. Whether
that holding prevails is irrelevant, as here the “practical effect” of a class waiver has no role
in the analysis.
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Part I describes the nature and purpose of arbitration, class action
litigation, and class arbitration, and traces the evolution of the two bodies of
law that have culminated in the present conflict: on the one hand, the
increasingly broad enforcement of arbitration agreements through judicial
interpretation of the FAA and, on the other hand, the expanding scope of
employee rights protected by Section 7 of the NLRA. Part II brings these
two bodies of law together by reviewing how the NLRB and courts have
attempted to resolve the apparent conflict. In D.R. Horton, Inc.,13 the
NLRB held that a class waiver in an employment agreement violated the
NLRA and that refusing to enforce the offending term did not conflict with
the FAA.14 While one federal court followed D.R. Horton and declared a
similar class waiver unenforceable,15 numerous other courts presented with
the same question have held that the FAA compels the enforcement of class
waivers in employment agreements.16
Part III seeks to resolve this split by undertaking what has thus far been
missing: an analysis of the distinction between substantive and procedural
rights as they relate to class waivers in employment arbitration agreements
in order to properly understand the relationship between the FAA and
NLRA. By way of comparison to a similar divide in the context of choice
of law and the Erie doctrine, this part explains why Section 7 rights,
including the right to invoke classwide proceedings, are substantive rights
outside the domain of the FAA. Finally, this part describes why this result
assuages the concerns raised by courts over the reach of the FAA under
Concepcion and related cases, and thus concludes that employment
arbitration agreements which waive all forms of classwide proceedings are
unenforceable.
I. STATUTES IN TENSION: THE FAA AND NLRA
This part serves two purposes. First, Parts I.A and I.B define and review
three foundational concepts: arbitration, class action, and class arbitration.
Next, Parts I.C and I.D use these concepts to trace the evolving
interpretations of the FAA and NLRA, which has resulted in the present
dispute over the enforceability of class waivers in employment arbitration
agreements.

13. 357 N.L.R.B. No. 184, 2012 WL 36274 (Jan. 3, 2012).
14. Id. at *5, *10.
15. Herrington v. Waterstone Mortg. Corp., No. 11-cv-779-bbc, 2012 WL 1242318, at
*7 (W.D. Wis. Mar. 16, 2012).
16. See Delock v. Securitas Sec. Servs. USA, Inc., No. 4:11-cv-520-DPM, 2012 WL
3150391 (E.D. Ark. Aug. 1, 2012); Jasso v. Money Mart Express, Inc., 879 F. Supp. 2d 1038
(N.D. Cal. 2012); Morvant v. P.F. Chang’s China Bistro, Inc., 870 F. Supp. 2d 831 (N.D.
Cal. 2012); Nelsen v. Legacy Partners Residential, Inc., 144 Cal. Rptr. 3d 198 (Ct. App.
2012); Iskanian v. CLS Transp. L.A., LLC, 142 Cal. Rptr. 3d 372 (Ct. App. 2012), appeal
docketed, 147 Cal. Rptr. 3d 324 (Cal. Sept. 19, 2012).
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A. Arbitration
Arbitration is an extrajudicial form of dispute resolution in which a
neutral third party selected by the parties hears arguments, reviews
evidence, and issues a final and binding decision.17 As with many other
forms of alternative dispute resolution, arbitration replaces the “default” use
of litigation to resolve disputes and allows the parties to tailor the
procedures used to resolve their dispute in a manner thought to be most
beneficial to their needs.18 The parties can agree to maintain some of the
procedural rules governing litigation in a judicial forum, while choosing to
abandon or alter other rules.19 For example, parties outside of a judicial
forum may opt to waive some or all of the rules of discovery or the rules of
evidence.20
Parties often employ arbitration to resolve disputes because it affords
many of the advantages of litigation at a lower cost to the parties.21 An
arbitration proceeding occurs before a fair and impartial professional,
mutually selected by the parties, who has expertise in the relevant area of
law.22 The parties can tailor the proceedings to contain as many or as few
procedural requirements as they desire, thus creating (at least in theory) a
more efficient, expeditious, and inexpensive form of justice.23 However,
use of arbitration, particularly in the employment context, raises many
practical concerns due to the significant power imbalance that often exists
between employer and employee, thus perhaps belying the perceived
benefits of arbitration.24

17. See IAN R. MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW 7 (1992); R. Gaull Silberman et
al., Alternative Dispute Resolution of Employment Discrimination Claims, 54 LA. L. REV.
1533, 1537 (1994); see also S.I. Strong, Does Class Arbitration “Change the Nature” of
Arbitration? Stolt-Nielsen, AT&T, and a Return to First Principles, 17 HARV. NEGOT. L.
REV. 201, 243–45 (2012).
18. See Silberman et al., supra note 17, at 1539.
19. Id.
20. See Norman T. Braslow, Contractual Stipulation for Judicial Review and Discovery
in United States-Japan Arbitration Contracts, 27 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 659, 667 (2004)
(“[A]rbitration can be considerably less expensive because there is far less discovery than is
generally permitted in litigation”); David H. Taylor & Sara M. Cliffe, Civil Procedure by
Contract: A Convoluted Confluence of Private Contract and Public Procedure in Need of
Congressional Control, 35 U. RICH. L. REV. 1085, 1086 (2002) (discussing agreements that
modify “what evidence may or may not be presented as proof”).
21. See Silberman et al., supra note 17, at 1539.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. See Alexander J.S. Colvin, An Empirical Study of Employment Arbitration: Case
Outcomes and Processes, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 1, 1 (2011) (finding that, in
arbitration, employees have a lower win rate and, when victorious, receive lower awards
compared to litigation); Alexander J.S. Colvin & Kelly Pike, The Impact of Case and
Arbitrator Characteristics on Employment Arbitration Outcomes 25 (June 2012)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent
.cgi?article=1022&context=conference (concluding that arbitration claims arising from an
employer-promulgated procedure “result in relatively fewer employee wins, lower damages,
and fewer compromise awards”).
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This Note focuses on predispute arbitration agreements—agreements in
which the parties stipulate, generally in a written contract, to resolve some
or all of their future disputes through arbitration.25 The resulting agreement
is often called “mandatory” arbitration because, having consented to submit
future disputes to arbitration, a party can be compelled into arbitration when
Predispute arbitration agreements are
such disputes later arise.26
appropriately referred to as “procedural contracts” because they allow
parties to bargain over procedural rights even before a dispute arises.27
While in recent decades the Supreme Court has permitted greater freedom
in the structuring of predispute arbitration agreements,28 this Note focuses
on the critical limits to enforceable arbitration agreements that still remain.
B. Class Action Litigation and Class Arbitration
The class action is a procedural mechanism that enables one or more
parties to bring a legal claim on behalf of other similarly situated
individuals.29 Largely unique to the American legal system,30 the class
action has been in use since 1966, when Congress promulgated Rule 23 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP).31 A Rule 23 class action has
the potential for far greater adjudicative efficiency by permitting, for
example, a million victims, each of whom have been defrauded of $100
apiece by a common defendant, to bring one $100 million lawsuit rather
than one million $100 lawsuits.32 Because class actions can allow for the
aggregation of many similar small value claims, they are considered by
many to serve an important public role of allowing “those who are less
powerful to band together . . . to seek redress of grievances that would go
unremedied if each litigant had to fight alone.”33 Given the high cost of
bringing a lawsuit, such small value claims would likely never be brought

25. See Richard E. Speidel, Consumer Arbitration of Statutory Claims: Has Pre-dispute
[Mandatory] Arbitration Outlived Its Welcome?, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 1069, 1069 (1998).
26. See id.
27. Christopher R. Drahozal & Peter B. Rutledge, Contract and Procedure, 94 MARQ. L.
REV. 1103, 1105–06 (2011).
28. See infra Part I.C.3–4.
29. See Maureen A. Weston, The Death of Class Arbitration After Concepcion?,
60 U. KAN. L. REV. 767, 770 (2012).
30. See THOMAS D. ROWE, JR. ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 641 (2d ed. 2008) (“[C]lass
actions remain another instance of ‘American exceptionalism’ in procedure.”).
31. See Weston, supra note 29, at 770. Under Rule 23, a claim can be brought on behalf
of others only if the claim satisfies requirements of numerosity of members, commonality of
questions of law or fact, typicality of claims or defense, and adequacy of representation. See
ROWE ET AL., supra note 30, at 646–50; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a). The class claim must
also be necessary either to avoid unfairness or serious hardship for the class representative,
or would be more efficient than individual litigation. See ROWE ET AL., supra note 30, at 650;
see also FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b).
32. ROWE ET AL., supra note 30, at 640.
33. See Weston, supra note 29, at 770–71 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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on an individual basis and can only practically be brought by way of a class
action.34
However, class actions raise concerns. While a class action case can
serve as a powerful deterrent to misbehavior, weak claims brought as a
class action can have the perverse effect of inducing settlement simply due
to the large amount of money at stake.35 Thus, the class action has
sometimes been characterized as “legalized blackmail.”36 Furthermore,
while a class action can increase efficiency by aggregating many claims, it
can also result in expensive discovery and difficulties in case management
and trial proceedings.37 Concerns also arise in ensuring that class counsel,
who often stands to receive a financial award far greater than any individual
class member, acts in the best interest of all of the class members.38
Class arbitration imports elements of class actions into the arbitral
context.39 While class arbitration has existed since the early 1980s, it was
not in significant use until receiving implicit approval from the Supreme
Court in Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle,40 decided in 2003.41 A
plurality held that, where a predispute arbitration agreement was silent on
whether classwide procedures could be used, the arbitrator could decide
whether the parties intended to allow classwide procedures in arbitration or
court.42 Spotting an open door to class arbitration, professional arbitration
providers such as the American Arbitration Association (AAA) and
JAMS43 soon after began setting up specialized rules for administering
class arbitrations.44
The rules promulgated for class arbitration closely resembled judicial
class actions. For example, under the Supplementary Rules of the AAA, if
an arbitrator concludes that a predispute arbitration agreement permits class
34. See, e.g., Carnegie v. Household Int’l, Inc., 376 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 2004) (“The
realistic alternative to a class action is not 17 million individual suits, but zero individual
suits, as only a lunatic or a fanatic sues for $30.”).
35. ROWE ET AL., supra note 30, at 640.
36. Weston, supra note 29, at 770.
37. See ROWE ET AL., supra note 30, at 640.
38. See id.
39. See Strong, supra note 17, at 205–06.
40. 539 U.S. 444 (2003).
41. See Drahozal & Rutledge, supra note 27, at 1139; Strong, supra note 17, at 206;
Weston, supra note 29, at 768.
42. See Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 452–53; see also Weston, supra note 29, at 768. To some
extent, the Supreme Court overruled this holding in Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds
International Corp, 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010). See infra Part I.C.4.
43. The organization was formally called Judicial Arbitration and Mediation Services,
Inc., but has since changed its name to JAMS, The Resolution Experts. About the JAMS
Name, JAMS, http://www.jamsadr.com/about-the-jams-name/ (last visited Mar. 19, 2013).
44. Strong, supra note 17, at 206; see also AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, SUPPLEMENTARY
RULES FOR CLASS ARBITRATIONS (effective Oct. 8, 2003) [hereinafter AAA SUPPLEMENTARY
RULES], available at http://www.adr.org/aaa/ShowPDF;jsessionid=Q38zRMZQvJFBzn295h
3vWxwZDyxRNyqnmT2dlynW2SmlyPCLGRpL!644581746?url=/cs/groups/commercial/
documents/document/dgdf/mda0/~edisp/adrstg_004129.pdf; JAMS, JAMS Class Action
Procedures (effective May 1, 2009), available at http://www.jamsadr.com/files/Uploads/
Documents/JAMS-Rules/JAMS_Class_Action_Procedures-2009.pdf.
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action, he must decide whether class arbitration is appropriate for the case
by using standards resembling those enumerated in Rule 23.45 If so, the
arbitrator adjudicates the case on the merits.46
This Note focuses on the use of class waivers in predispute arbitration
agreements. Such agreements require that disputes be resolved in
arbitration and bar the use of class arbitration, thus effectively precluding
all forms of class proceedings in the resolution of all future disputes.47 This
Note argues that class waivers are unenforceable in employment predispute
arbitration agreements.
C. The FAA and the Expanding Scope of
Enforceable Arbitration Agreements
The Federal Arbitration Act undergirds the discussion and analysis to
come. This section first describes the Act’s inception and structure. It then
reviews three legal developments that are essential to understanding the
present conflict: the application of the FAA to employment contracts, the
arbitrability of statutory claims under the FAA, and the interaction between
the FAA and class waivers.
1. The Federal Arbitration Act
Through the beginning of the twentieth century, courts viewed predispute
arbitration agreements with a high degree of suspicion, often declaring them
unenforceable, because they sought to “oust” the court of jurisdiction for
adjudication of contractual disputes.48 In response, Congress passed the
Federal Arbitration Act of 192549 to combat “widespread judicial hostility
to arbitration agreements”50 and establish a “liberal federal policy favoring
arbitration agreements.”51 The Supreme Court has written that the FAA’s
purpose is to put the enforceability of arbitration agreements on equal
footing with all other contracts.52 Section 2 of the FAA—the “primary
substantive provision of the Act”53—states in full:
45. Drahozal & Rutledge, supra note 27, at 1140; see also AAA SUPPLEMENTARY
RULES, supra note 44, R. 4.
46. See AAA SUPPLEMENTARY RULES, supra note 44, R. 7.
47. See Drahozal & Rutledge, supra note 27, at 1106–07; Weston, supra note 29, at 767
n.1.
48. See Drahozal & Rutledge, supra note 27, at 1112; see also Peter B. Rutledge,
Whither Arbitration?, 6 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 549, 552–53 (2008).
49. Pub. L. No. 68-401, 43 Stat. 883 (codified at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–14 (2006)).
50. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1745 (2011).
51. Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983); see
also Weston, supra note 29, at 771 (“The regulatory framework for arbitration in the United
States is set forth in the Federal Arbitration Act of 1925.”).
52. See Hall St. Assocs. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 581 (2008); see also Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991) (explaining that the FAA’s “purpose
was to reverse the longstanding judicial hostility to arbitration agreements . . . and to place
arbitration agreements upon the same footing as other contracts”); Drahozal & Rutledge,
supra note 27, at 1112.
53. Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 24.
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A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a
transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy
thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to
perform the whole or any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to
submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such a
contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract.54

This section establishes that agreements to arbitrate dealing with
commerce and maritime matters are fully enforceable, whether regarding
present or future disputes.55 If parties agree to resolve future disputes using
the procedural rules of arbitration rather than the default procedural rules of
litigation, a court later reviewing the contract must respect and enforce this
agreement as written.56 The FAA establishes, with discrete and limited
exceptions, a body of substantive federal law declaring contractual
agreements to arbitrate, including predispute agreements, “valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable.”57 As detailed below, the scope of this
mandate has been significantly broadened in recent decades.
2. The FAA and Employment Agreements
In 1991, in Circuit City Stores v. Adams, Inc.,58 the Supreme Court
addressed whether and to what extent the FAA applied to disputes arising
under employment contracts. Section 1 of the FAA excludes from its
coverage “contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any
other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.”59 The
question for the Court was how broadly to read the exempted “class of
workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce”—whether it should be
construed narrowly to exempt only arbitration agreements of workers
engaged in transportation or broadly to exempt effectively all employment
arbitration agreements.60
Employing a thorough textual analysis, the Court held that “the text of
the FAA forecloses the construction of § 1 . . . which would exclude all
employment contracts from the FAA.”61 The Court reasoned that the
residual “class of workers” term must be controlled and defined by
reference to the enumerated categories of workers that precede it—
“seamen” and “railroad employees”—and so the exemption can apply only
54. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
55. See MACNEIL, supra note 17, at 102.
56. See Weston, supra note 29, at 772 (“A fundamental principle underlying the FAA is
to respect freedom of contract.”).
57. 9 U.S.C. § 2; see Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 12 (1984) (explaining that
the FAA “‘creates a body of federal substantive law’” (quoting Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at
25 n.32)).
58. 532 U.S. 105 (2001).
59. 9 U.S.C. § 1.
60. Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 109.
61. Id. at 119.
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narrowly to “contracts of employment of transportation workers.”62 Thus,
the FAA and its “healthy regard”63 for the enforceability of predispute
arbitration agreements governs the broad swath of employment contracts.64
3. The FAA and Arbitrability of Statutory Claims
Since Congress passed the FAA in 1925, the Supreme Court has reached
varied conclusions on whether the statute can compel arbitration of disputes
that are statutory in nature. In the decades immediately following
enactment, the scope of the FAA in this area was significantly limited.
Courts held that many disputes arising under federal statutes, such as
securities laws, antitrust laws, and civil rights laws, were nonarbitrable
because arbitration was inconsistent with Congress’s intent in creating a
cause of action under those statutes.65 This broad “nonarbitrability
doctrine” persisted for roughly fifty years after the enactment of the FAA.66
This began to change in the 1980s.67 For example, in the 1985 case
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,68 the Supreme
Court considered the enforceability of a predispute arbitration agreement
between Mitsubishi, a Japanese automobile manufacturer, and Soler
Their agreement
Chrysler-Plymouth, a Puerto Rican distributor.69
stipulated that all future disputes, controversies, or differences between the
parties under their distribution contract would be resolved through
arbitration in Japan, in accordance with the rules of the Japan Commercial
When a dispute over shipments arose,
Arbitration Association.70
Mitsubishi filed suit in federal court in Puerto Rico and moved to compel
arbitration under the FAA and the terms of the parties’ arbitration
agreement.71 Soler then counterclaimed, alleging, among other things,
antitrust violations under the Sherman Antitrust Act.72 The question was

62. Id.
63. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991).
64. Justice Stevens, in dissent, accused the majority of “[p]laying ostrich” by ignoring
the “substantial history” indicating that the exemption language was added to the FAA
precisely to alleviate concerns by labor unions that the statute might later be interpreted to
apply to employment contracts. Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 126–28 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
The proposed Arbitration Fairness Act seeks to amend the FAA and effectively overrule
Circuit City. Its most recent incarnation states in relevant part: “no predispute arbitration
agreement shall be valid or enforceable if it requires arbitration of an employment dispute.”
S. 987, 112th Cong. § 402 (2011).
65. Drahozal & Rutledge, supra note 27, at 1112–13; see, e.g., Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S.
427, 438 (1953) (holding that antitrust claims are nonarbitrable).
66. See Drahozal & Rutledge, supra note 27, at 1113 (describing how the bifurcation of
arbitral disputes and nonarbitrable disputes persisted from 1925 until the 1970s and 1980s);
Rutledge, supra note 48, at 553.
67. See Drahozal & Rutledge, supra note 27, at 1113.
68. 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
69. Id. at 616–17.
70. Id. at 617.
71. Id. at 617–19; see also 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2006).
72. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 619–20.
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whether a statutory claim brought by Soler under the Sherman Act could be
compelled into arbitration via the FAA.73
Relying on the “liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements,”
the Court held that, as a general rule, arbitration agreements must be
enforced for all claims, including those based on statutory rights.74 As a
guiding principle, the Court reasoned, Congress’s preeminent concern in
passing the FAA was “to enforce private agreements into which parties had
entered,”75 and so agreements to arbitrate must be “rigorously enforce[d]”76
with “any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues . . . resolved in
favor of arbitration.”77 The Court held that short of Congressional intent
deriving from text or legislative history to the contrary, statutory claims can
properly be resolved in arbitration because, “[h]aving made the bargain to
arbitrate, the party should be held to it.”78
The Court stressed that compelling the resolution of the claim to
arbitration in no way conflicted with Soler’s ability to bring antitrust claims
under the Sherman Act:
By agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the
substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their
resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum. It trades the
procedures and opportunity for review of the courtroom for the simplicity,
informality, and expedition of arbitration.79

Because Soler “effectively may vindicate its statutory cause of action in
the arbitral forum,”80 the Court held the arbitration agreement fully
enforceable.81 Critically, however, congruent with its reasoning the Court
carved out an essential limitation: where an arbitration agreement serves as
a “prospective waiver of a party’s right to pursue statutory remedies . . .
[the Court] would have little hesitation in condemning the agreement as
against public policy.”82
In 1989, the Court applied similar reasoning in Rodriguez de Quijas v.
Shearson/American Express, Inc.83 in holding that claims brought under the
Securities Act of 1933 were arbitrable; again, the change in forum did not
forfeit any substantive rights of the parties.84 The Court explicitly
overruled its holding in Wilko v. Swan,85 an earlier case from the “non-

73. Id. at 624–25.
74. Id.
75. Id. (quoting Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 221 (1985)).
76. Id. at 626 (quoting Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 221 (1985)).
77. Id. (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24–
25 (1983)).
78. Id. at 628.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 637.
81. Id. at 640.
82. Id. at 637 n.19.
83. 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
84. Id. at 481.
85. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
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arbitrability” era.86 However, the Court was careful to note that the
predispute arbitration agreement in question only interfered with
“procedural components” of the Securities Act, including broad venue
provisions in federal courts, nationwide service of process in federal courts,
removal of amount-in-controversy requirements, and concurrent state and
federal jurisdiction.87 Other provisions of the Securities Act not in dispute
are substantive, such as placing the burden on the seller to prove lack of
scienter when a buyer alleges fraud.88 Waiver is permissible for procedural
components of the statute, as the Court rejected the “outmoded
presumption” that arbitration weakens “the protections afforded in the
substantive law to would-be complainants.”89
Similarly, in 1991, the Supreme Court considered in Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.90 whether a statutory claim brought in
federal court under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act91 (ADEA)
could be compelled into arbitration per the terms of a predispute arbitration
agreement between Interstate and one of its employees.92 Declaring the
arbitration agreement enforceable and compelling arbitration, the Court
reiterated many of its arguments from Mitsubishi. The Court stated that the
employee, because he had agreed to arbitrate, had the burden of showing
congressional intent to preclude waiver of a judicial forum for ADEA
claims.93 This congressional intent, if it exists, “will be discoverable in the
text of the ADEA, its legislative history, or an ‘inherent conflict’ between
arbitration and the ADEA’s underlying purposes.”94 The Court stressed
that “‘questions of arbitrability must be addressed with a healthy regard for
the federal policy favoring arbitration.’”95
Applying this test, the Court failed to find the necessary congressional
intent or conflict of underlying purpose in the text or legislative history of
the ADEA.96 Arbitration falls within the “ADEA’s flexible approach to
resolution of claims”97 and allows parties to broadly select the forum for
resolving their dispute.98 The Court also rejected arguments that specific
aspects of arbitration were incompatible with resolution of a suit brought by
an employee under the ADEA, such as concerns of bias by the arbitration
86. Rodriguez de Quijas, 490 U.S. at 485.
87. Id. at 481–82.
88. Id. at 481.
89. Id.
90. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
91. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634 (2006).
92. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 23.
93. Id. at 26 (citing Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 227
(1987)).
94. Id. (quoting Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 227 (1987)).
95. Id. (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24
(1983)).
96. Id. at 35.
97. Id. at 29.
98. See id. (citing Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, 490 U.S. 477, 483
(1989)).
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panel, lack of extensive discovery, absence of written opinions, inequality
of bargaining power between employee and employer, and—of particular
importance for this Note—absence of class action relief through arbitration
procedures.99 On this last point, the Court noted that the arbitrator was not
restricted in the types of relief he was permitted to award, and applicable
New York Stock Exchange rules provided for collective proceedings.100 At
least on these facts, arbitration did not impinge upon class relief or any
other underlying purpose of the ADEA that would render the parties’
predispute arbitration agreement unenforceable. As in Mitsubishi, the Court
emphasized that arbitration did not prevent the plaintiff from vindicating his
underlying age discrimination claim, and so, “‘[b]y agreeing to arbitrate a
statutory claim, [the plaintiff] does not forgo the substantive rights afforded
by the statute.’”101
Finally, in 2012, the Court in CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood102
considered the specificity of legislative instruction required to overcome the
presumption of enforceability of an arbitration agreement. The case dealt
with a credit card application that stipulated arbitration for resolution of all
future disputes.103 Customers brought a claim under the Credit Repair
Organizations Act104 (CROA) for misleading representations made by the
defendant, a credit card company.105 The customers argued that, because
the CROA contains a provision stating that “‘[y]ou have a right to sue a
credit repair organization that violates the Credit Repair Organization
Act,’”106 they could not be compelled into arbitration despite the terms of
their predispute arbitration agreement and should have been permitted to
bring their CROA claim in court.107
Citing Mitsubishi, the Court reasoned that arbitration agreements must be
enforced according to their terms, even when the claims at issue are federal
statutory claims, unless the federal statute overrides the FAA by a “contrary
congressional command.”108 The Court held that statutory language merely
suggesting a cause of action (here a “right to sue”) is not a sufficient
“contrary congressional command” to override the FAA.109 As in
Mitsubishi, Rodriquez de Quijas, and Gilmer, compelling arbitration does
not conflict with any substantive statutory rights afforded by the CROA
because “contractually required arbitration of claims satisfies the statutory

99. Id. at 30–33.
100. Id. at 32.
101. Id. at 26 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S.
614, 628 (1985)).
102. 132 S. Ct. 665 (2012).
103. Id. at 668.
104. 15 U.S.C. § 1679 (2006).
105. CompuCredit, 132 S. Ct. at 665.
106. Id. at 669 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1679c(a)).
107. Id.
108. Id. (quoting Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226 (1987)).
109. Id. at 670 (quoting Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226
(1987)).
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prescription of civil liability in court.”110 If Congress wishes to overrule
the FAA by prohibiting use of arbitration for certain statutory claims, it
must do so “in a manner less obtuse” than the language of the CROA.111
The “right to sue” language provides only a “guarantee of the legal power
to impose liability.”112 Because this right could be effectuated through
arbitration, the Court enforced the terms of the arbitration agreement.
4. The FAA and Class Waivers
The Supreme Court has also shifted in its interpretation of the
relationship between the FAA and the use of class arbitration. The Court’s
plurality opinion in Bazzle, described above,113 was viewed as a signal that
arbitrators could use class arbitration when appropriate and, consequently,
use of class arbitration increased significantly.114 More recently, however,
the Court has decided two cases that significantly increase the ability of a
party to avoid use of class proceedings—in both court and arbitration—
through use of class waivers in predispute arbitration agreements.115
In the 2010 case Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds International
Corp.,116 the Court decided whether imposing class arbitration on parties
whose arbitration agreement is silent on that issue is consistent with the
FAA.117 The arbitration agreement in dispute, between shipping companies
and a corporate customer, required arbitration of all future disputes but was
silent as to whether this permitted use of class arbitration.118
The Court began its analysis with “the basic precept that arbitration ‘is a
matter of consent, not coercion.’”119 Accordingly, the Court must “give
effect to the contractual rights and expectation of the parties” and ensure
that “the parties’ intentions control.”120 One area in which the parties must
consent is “with whom they choose to arbitrate their disputes.”121 Because
class arbitration would essentially require the defendant to arbitrate with
many more parties than it explicitly consented, the Court concluded that “a
110. Id. at 671.
111. Id. at 672.
112. Id. at 671 (emphasis omitted).
113. See supra notes 40–42 and accompanying text.
114. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
115. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011); Stolt-Nielsen S.A.
v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010).
116. 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010).
117. Id. at 1764.
118. Id. at 1764–66. The Court noted initially that its plurality opinion in Bazzle did not
bear on the present analysis. The Court rejected the parties’ view that the Bazzle plurality
stood for the proposition that “an arbitrator, not a court, [should] decide whether a contract
permits class arbitration.” Id. at 1772. Rather, the Bazzle plurality determined only that the
arbitrator could determine whether an arbitration agreement was indeed silent on the issue of
class arbitration. Id. at 1771. Thus, the question of whether class arbitration is permitted
given contractual silence remained unanswered. Id. at 1772.
119. Id. at 1773 (quoting Volt Info. Scis. v. Bd. of Trs. of the Leland Stanford Junior
Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 479 (1989)).
120. Id. at 1774 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
121. Id.
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party may not be compelled under the FAA to submit to class arbitration
unless there is a contractual basis for concluding that the party agreed to do
so.”122
In the Court’s reasoning, explicit agreement to enter into class arbitration
is necessary because “class-action arbitration changes the nature of
arbitration to such a degree that it cannot be presumed the parties consented
to it by simply agreeing to submit their disputes to an arbitrator.”123 The
Court offered two justifications for this conclusion. First, class arbitration
diminishes the usual benefits of arbitration—“lower costs, greater
efficiency and speed, and the ability to choose expert adjudicators to resolve
specialized disputes.”124 Second, the shift to class arbitration introduces
fundamental changes because, as compared to bilateral arbitration, class
arbitration calls for the resolution of many disputes between hundreds or
thousands of parties, often sacrifices privacy and confidentiality, binds
many absent parties, and greatly increases the commercial stakes.125 Class
arbitration fundamentally differs from bilateral arbitration and, under the
FAA, cannot be imposed on an unwilling party absent explicit contractual
consent.126
In 2011, the Supreme Court addressed for the first time the enforceability
of contractual class waivers in Concepcion. A cell phone contract between
AT&T and a customer required that all future disputes be brought in
arbitration and in the parties’ “‘individual capacity, and not as a plaintiff or
class member in any purported class or representative proceeding.’”127
However, under California law, a clause waiving classwide procedures in
consumer adhesion contracts was unconscionable and thus
unenforceable.128 The Concepcions argued that this rationale for not
enforcing the arbitration agreement fell under the “saving clause” of Section
2 of the FAA, which requires that arbitration agreements be declared
unenforceable “upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract.”129 If the California law was not included
within the saving clause, then the FAA would preempt the state law and the

122. Id. at 1775.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. See id. at 1776.
126. See id. For an article taking to task the Court’s conclusion that class arbitration
fundamentally changes the nature of arbitration, see Strong, supra note 17 (arguing that class
arbitration closely resembles other forms of multiparty arbitration).
127. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1744 (2011) (quoting Petition
for Writ of Certiorari at 61a, Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (No. 09-893)).
128. Id. at 1746; see also Discover Bank v. Superior Court of L.A., 30 Cal. Rptr. 3d 76,
87 (2005) (holding that where a class waiver “is found in a consumer contract of adhesion in
a setting in which disputes between the contracting parties predictably involve small
amounts of damages, and when it is alleged that the party with the superior bargaining power
has carried out a scheme to deliberately cheat large numbers of consumers out of
individually small sums of money,” the waiver is unconscionable and thus unenforceable).
129. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1746 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006)).
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parties’ arbitration agreement waiving use of classwide procedures would
be enforceable.130
Relying heavily on Stolt-Nielsen, the Court held that the California law
stood “as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full
purposes and objectives of Congress” in enacting the FAA, and so was
preempted by the FAA.131 By entering into an arbitration agreement,
parties seek to contractually modify the procedural rules that will be used to
resolve their dispute.132 The Court viewed use of class arbitration rather
than bilateral arbitration as a modification of procedural rules akin to
altering the rules of discovery or evidence.133 The California law, by
forbidding class arbitration waivers in consumer adhesion contracts and
thus requiring the availability of classwide procedures, interfered with the
freedom of the parties to select their procedural rules, and so “create[d] a
scheme inconsistent with the FAA.”134
As in Stolt-Nielsen, the Court emphasized the significant differences
between class arbitration and bilateral arbitration. Class arbitration
“sacrifices the principal advantage of arbitration—its informality—and
makes the process slower, more costly, and more likely to generate
procedural morass than final judgment.”135 Even if a state has legitimate
grounds for requiring class proceedings—such as the ability to “prosecute
small-dollar claims that might otherwise slip through the legal system”136—
a state law, such as the California law, is impermissible.137 By requiring
procedures beyond the scope of the parties’ consent, the law stands as an
obstacle to the FAA’s principle purpose of ensuring that private arbitration
agreements are enforced according to their terms.138 Reading a class
arbitration requirement into the FAA’s savings clause for consumer
agreements would be “absolutely inconsistent with the provisions of the
[FAA].”139 Accordingly, the Court overruled the state unconscionability
law, with language suggesting a broad endorsement of the enforceability of
class waivers in predispute arbitration agreements.140

130. See id. at 1747.
131. Id. at 1753 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
132. Id. at 1748–49 (citations omitted) (“[W]e have held that parties may agree . . . to
arbitrate according to specific rules.”).
133. Id. at 1747.
134. Id. at 1748.
135. Id. at 1751.
136. Id. at 1753.
137. See id. at 1748.
138. See id. The Court reiterated the point made in Stolt-Nielsen that class arbitration
cannot be used absent explicit consent from both parties. Id. at 1750–51 (“The conclusion
follows that class arbitration, to the extent it is manufactured by [California law] rather than
consensual, is inconsistent with the FAA.”).
139. Id. at 1748 (quoting AT&T v. Cent. Office Tel., Inc., 524 U.S. 214, 227–28 (1998)).
140. See id. at 1753; see also Weston, supra note 29, at 781 (“Concepcion appeared to
require that courts enforce class action waivers, even under circumstances where the bans on
collective relief would otherwise impose unconscionable results.”).
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Putting these developments in FAA jurisprudence together, a few general
conclusions can be made. First, the FAA applies to nearly all arbitration
agreements in employment contracts, with only narrow exceptions for
transportation workers.141 Second, where parties have entered into a
predispute arbitration agreement, the FAA compels arbitration of many
types of statutory claims, provided that arbitration will not infringe upon
any substantive rights of the parties.142 Third, such claims must be
arbitrated according to the clear intent of the parties as expressed in their
arbitration agreement.143 Where the parties have not agreed to the use of
class arbitration, the arbitrator cannot later implement it absent the parties’
Class waivers in arbitration agreements are generally
consent.144
enforceable, as state law cannot require the availability of class
arbitration.145 Statutory rights of employees, to be discussed below, should
be analyzed with this framework in mind.
D. The NLRA and the Development of Protected Employee Activities
The NLRA is a cornerstone piece of federal legislation establishing basic
rights of employees. In order to determine how these rights interact with
the FAA, it is necessary to understand the substantive nature of the NLRA
and the type of employee activities it protects. To that end, this section first
provides background on important elements of the NLRA. Next, it
describes the types of employee activities protected by the NLRA as
interpreted by the Supreme Court and NLRB, and then it reviews a recent
NLRB decision ruling that an employee’s invocation of classwide
proceedings is one such activity. Finally, this section discusses the
waivability of NLRA protections and the appropriate remedy if the Board
or a court finds a violation.
1. Purpose and Structure of the NLRA
The National Labor Relations Act of 1935146 sought to strengthen the
ability of workers to organize in order to better their employment

141. See supra Part I.C.2.
142. See supra Part I.C.3.
143. See supra Part I.C.4.
144. See supra notes 115–26 and accompanying text.
145. See supra notes 127–40 and accompanying text.
146. Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–
169 (2006)). Portions of the NLRA were amended in the Labor Management Relations Act
of 1947 (also known as the Taft-Hartley Act), Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136 (1947)
(codified at 29 U.S.C. § 151), and the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of
1959 (also known as the Landrum-Griffin Act), Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 519 (1959)
(codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 401–531). For a historical overview of the development of the
NLRA, see JOHN E. HIGGINS, JR., THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW: THE BOARD, THE COURTS,
AND THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT 35–63 (6th ed. 2012).
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conditions.147 Section 1 of the NLRA makes clear that the primary focus of
the statute is the right of employees to act collectively148:
It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States . . . [to protect]
the exercise by workers of full freedom of association, self-organization,
and designation of representatives of their own choosing, for the purpose
of negotiating the terms and conditions of their employment or other
mutual aid or protection.149

The NLRA gives employees a right to organize and, unlike the National
Industrial Recovery Act150 (NIRA) passed two years prior, the NLRA
makes this right legally enforceable.151 The linchpin of the NLRA is
Section 7, which provides: “Employees shall have the right to selforganization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain
collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in
other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection.”152
Section 7 establishes three rights—the right to organize, the right to
bargain collectively, and the right to engage in other concerted activities—
that were considered necessary “to establish a balance of bargaining power
between employer and employee and thereby avoid the pitfalls and
inadequacies that had characterized earlier labor legislation [such as the
NIRA].”153 The core purpose of Section 7, as the Supreme Court has
written, is to “affirmatively guarantee[] employees the most basic rights of
industrial self-determination.”154 To effectuate this guarantee, Section 8 of
the NLRA provides: “It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer
. . . to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed in section [7].”155 Legally enforceable protection of
employees’ right to engage in concerted activities is, in the words of the
Supreme Court, the “fundamental right” protected by the NLRA.156
To enforce the rights created by Sections 7 and 8, the NLRA established
a new federal agency called the National Labor Relations Board.157
Sections 3 through 6 of the NLRA created the Board and set out basic
details of its composition and operations.158 Section 9 gives the Board
exclusive jurisdiction over questions of employee representation,159 and
Section 10 gives the Board exclusive jurisdiction over enforcement of
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

HIGGINS, supra note 146, at 28.
Id. at 82.
29 U.S.C. § 151 (2006).
15 U.S.C. § 703 (repealed 1935).
See HIGGINS, supra note 146, at 28.
29 U.S.C. § 157.
HIGGINS, supra note 146, at 28–29.
Emporium Capwell Co. v. W. Addition Cmty. Org., 420 U.S. 50, 61 (1975).
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1).
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 33 (1937).
See HIGGINS, supra note 146, at 29.
See 29 U.S.C. §§ 153–156.
See HIGGINS, supra note 146, at 29; see also 29 U.S.C. § 159.
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Section 8 unfair labor practices.160 Section 10 also sets forth, in broad
terms, NLRB procedures, including provisions for judicial review and
enforcement of Board orders.161
2. Scope of Section 7 Rights
Section 7 of the NLRA grants employees the right “to engage in other
concerted activities for the purpose of . . . mutual aid or protection.”162
This clause establishes employee protection not just in joining or assisting
labor organizations but also in engaging in a broad category of activities
that are carried out for their “mutual aid or protection.”163 To receive
Section 7 protection, an employee activity must meet two requirements.
First, the activity must be “concerted”; it must be “undertaken together by
two or more employees or undertaken by one on behalf of others.”164
Second, an employee activity must be for “mutual aid or protection.”165
Reviewing the types of activities encompassed by these terms will aid in
understanding why the Board properly held recently that they include
employee use of classwide proceedings.
a. “Concerted Activity”
Courts and the NLRB have endorsed a broad reading of the “concerted”
requirement of Section 7 activities. Narrowly, employees act concertedly
when they engage in direct group action and “have joined together in order
to achieve common goals.”166 In addition, an individual employee can
engage in concerted activity in two other circumstances: “(1) that in which
the lone employee intends to induce group activity, and (2) that in which
the employee acts as a representative of at least one other employee.”167
The Supreme Court has justified this broad reading of Section 7 by
reasoning that “[t]here is no indication that Congress intended to limit this
protection to situations in which an employee’s activity and that of his
fellow employees combine with one another in any particular way.”168
Applying this standard, an individual employee engages in “concerted
activity” when he or she protests working hours and travel requirements in
the presence of other employees,169 engages in conversations for the

160. See HIGGINS, supra note 146, at 29; see also 29 U.S.C. § 160.
161. See HIGGINS, supra note 146, at 29.
162. 29 U.S.C. § 157.
163. HIGGINS, supra note 146, at 83.
164. Id. at 83–84.
165. For a general summary of these two requirements, see Ann C. Hodges, Can
Compulsory Arbitration Be Reconciled with Section 7 Rights?, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
173, 187–200 (2003); see also HIGGINS, supra note 146, at 209–33.
166. NLRB v. City Disposal Sys., 465 U.S. 822, 830 (1984); see also HIGGINS, supra note
146, at 210–11.
167. City Disposal Sys., 465 U.S. at 831.
168. Id. at 835.
169. See Am. Red Cross Blood Servs. Johnstown Region, 322 N.L.R.B. 590, 594 (1996).
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purpose of initiating group activity,170 composes a petition protesting a pay
system,171 writes a letter to a newspaper seeking community support for a
strike,172 or posts notices regarding workplace illness seeking discussion
with other employees.173 However, activity by an individual is not
concerted if undertaken solely “by and on behalf of the employee
himself.”174 Thus, an employee’s refusal to operate equipment that he
believes is unsafe is not concerted activity where no other employees had
similarly complained.175
b. “Mutual Aid or Protection”
A comparably generous reading has been given to the “mutual aid or
protection” requirement.176 Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB177 is the foundational
Supreme Court case establishing the breadth of activities encompassed by
this clause. In this case, Eastex, a paper products manufacturer, had barred
union representatives from distributing to Eastex employees a newsletter
seeking union membership and support for proposed employment-related
legislation.178 The union filed a claim with the NLRB, alleging an illegal
restraint on employees’ right to engage in “concerted activities for the
purpose of . . . mutual aid or protection.”179 The case ultimately proceeded
to the Supreme Court specifically to address the scope of the “mutual aid or
protection” clause.180
The Court ruled that employees act for the purpose of “mutual aid or
protection” whenever they seek to improve their terms and conditions of
employment, even if these activities occur outside the immediate employeeemployer relationship.181 Employees’ activities are protected where, as
here, they seek to appeal to legislators to protect their interests as
employees, and also whenever employees “seek to improve working
conditions through resort to administrative and judicial forums.”182 The
Court held that a narrower reading of the Section 7 protections would
“‘frustrate the policy of the [NLRA] to protect the right of workers to act
While the Court
together to better their working conditions.’”183
170. See Circle K Corp., 305 N.L.R.B. 932 (1991).
171. See Globe Sec. Sys., 301 N.L.R.B. 1219, 1221 (1991).
172. See Dougherty Lumber Co., 299 N.L.R.B. 295 (1990), enforced, 941 F.2d 1209 (6th
Cir. 1991).
173. See Martin Marietta Corp., 293 N.L.R.B. 719 (1989).
174. Meyers Indus., 281 N.L.R.B. 882, 885 (1986).
175. See Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 269 N.L.R.B. 881 (1984).
176. See HIGGINS, supra note 146, at 220–27.
177. 437 U.S. 556 (1978).
178. Id. at 559–61.
179. Id. at 558 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2006)).
180. Id. at 562 (“Because of apparent differences among the Courts of Appeals as to the
scope of rights protected by the ‘mutual aid or protection’ clause of § 7 . . . we granted
certiorari.”).
181. Id. at 565.
182. Id. at 566.
183. Id. at 567 (quoting NLRB v. Wash. Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9, 14 (1962)).
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acknowledged that some activities may be too attenuated to be covered by
the “mutual aid or protection” clause, the Court left it to the Board to
analyze possible borderline cases in the first instance.184
Accordingly, Section 7 has been interpreted to protect various forms of
appeals to legislators or agencies and filings of judicial actions. Employees
engage in Section 7 protected activity when they write letters to legislators
opposing changes in immigration law that may affect job security,185 file
safety complaints with state agencies,186 file employment discrimination
claims with a state civil rights commission,187 or call the Department of
Labor regarding changes in lunch policy.188 Similarly, Section 7 covers an
employee who files a petition in court seeking an injunction against
employer harassment,189 a group of employees who file an invasion of
privacy suit against an employer using listening devices,190 an employee
who joins others in filing a libel suit,191 and employees who file a breach of
contract lawsuit against their employer.192 In general, such appeals to
agencies or courts are activities for “mutual aid and protection” so long as
they are not done out of malice or bad faith,193 even if they are ultimately
found to be without merit.194
3. Class Action As a Protected Section 7 Right
Recently, in D.R. Horton,195 the Board applied these standards in
considering whether, by filing a class action disputing the classification of
him and others as supervisors, an employee engaged in activity protected by
Section 7. The case dealt with a claim brought by Michael Cuda, a former
employee of home building company D.R. Horton.196 D.R. Horton’s
employment agreement, signed by Cuda as a condition of employment,
stipulated that all disputes be resolved exclusively in arbitration and that the
arbitrator “may hear only Employee’s individual claims . . . and does not
have authority to fashion a proceeding as a class or collective action or to
award relief to a group or class of employees in one arbitration
proceeding.”197 Cuda filed a claim with the NLRB, alleging that Section 7
protected his right to invoke class proceedings, and so D.R. Horton violated

184. Id. at 567–68.
185. See Kaiser Eng’rs, 213 N.L.R.B. 752 (1974).
186. See Wolfkill Feed & Fertilizer Corp., 277 N.L.R.B. 635 (1985).
187. See Franklin Iron & Metal Corp., 315 N.L.R.B. 819 (1994), enforced, 83 F.3d 156
(6th Cir. 1996).
188. See Salisbury Hotel, 283 N.L.R.B. 685, 685 (1987).
189. See Mohave Elec. Coop. v. NLRB, 206 F.3d 1183 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
190. See Health Enters. of Am., 282 N.L.R.B. 214, 215 (1986).
191. See Sarkes Tarzian, 149 N.L.R.B. 147 (1964).
192. See Trinity Trucking & Materials Corp., 221 N.L.R.B. 364 (1975).
193. Id. at 365.
194. Garage Mgmt. Corp., 334 N.L.R.B. 940, 940 (2001).
195. 357 N.L.R.B. No. 184, 2012 WL 36274 (Jan. 3, 2012).
196. Id. at *1.
197. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Section 8 by maintaining an employment contract that required the
arbitrator to resolve all disputes on an individual basis.198
Quoting Eastex, the Board first reasoned that Section 7 protects
employees seeking to improve their working conditions through resort to
administrative, judicial, and arbitral forums, as all are activities undertaken
for “mutual aid or protection.”199 The Board had previously held that a suit
filed by multiple employees is a form of concerted activity, and so it
concluded that the same classification should apply to claims brought on a
classwide basis.200 This is true even if the suit is initiated unilaterally, on
behalf of other employees.201 Allowing an employee to assert a claim
collectively, the Board wrote, serves the purpose of “mutual aid or
protection,” and is in line with the underlying purpose of the NLRA as
“[e]mployees are both more likely to assert their legal rights and also more
likely to do so effectively if they can do so collectively.”202 Thus, the
Board held that “an individual who files a class or collective action
regarding wages, hours or working conditions, whether in court or before an
arbitrator, seeks to initiate or induce group action and is engaged in conduct
protected by Section 7.”203 The latter portion of this opinion—whether the
Section 7 violation rendered D.R. Horton’s arbitration agreement
unenforceable—is discussed below.204
4. Waivability and Enforcement of Section 7 Rights
Once an employee activity is deemed protected under Section 7, a related
question is whether the right to engage in the activity can be waived by a
contractual agreement between employee and employer. The Supreme
Court addressed whether employees can waive their protected rights in
National Licorice Co. v. NLRB.205
In this case, the employment contract between National Licorice
Company and its employees required that all employees relinquish “the
right to strike, the right to demand a closed shop or signed agreement with

198. Id. at *2.
199. Id. (quoting Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 565–66 (1978)).
200. See id. (citing Salt River Valley Water Users Ass’n, 99 N.L.R.B. 849, 853–54
(1952); Spandsco Oil & Royalty Co., 42 N.L.R.B. 942, 948–49 (1942)).
201. See id. at *3.
202. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
203. Id. at *4; see also Hodges, supra note 165, at 229 (“[A] mandatory arbitration
agreement should be found unlawful if it does not expressly permit the unquestionably
concerted activities of class action . . . .”). This right does not guarantee class certification.
Rather, “it guarantees only employees’ opportunity to pursue without employer coercion,
restraint or interference such claims of a class or collective nature as may be available to
them under Federal, State or local law.” D.R. Horton, 2012 WL 36274, at *12 n.24. An
employee must be permitted, for example, to use Rule 23 to seek class certification.
However, if a judge determines that the Rule 23 requirements are not met, he can then deny
certification without infringing the Section 7 right. Id.
204. See infra Part II.A.
205. 309 U.S. 350 (1940).
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any union.”206 This requirement clearly violated “the employees’ rights to
organize and bargain collectively guaranteed by §§ 7 and 8 of the
[NLRA].”207 The question, however, was whether a violation of the NLRA
was grounds to declare the contract unenforceable.208
The Court ruled that the Board was empowered to declare the
employment contracts unenforceable under its Section 10 remedial power
because “the contracts were the fruits of unfair labor practices, stipulated
for the renunciation by the employees of rights guaranteed by the [NLRA],
and were a continuing means of thwarting the policy of the [NLRA].”209
The rights protected by Sections 7 and 8 are “public right[s] vested in [the
NLRB] as a public body, charged in the public interest with the duty of
preventing unfair labor practices.”210 Accordingly, “employers cannot set
at naught the National Labor Relations Act by inducing their workmen to
agree not to demand performance of the duties which it imposes.”211
The Supreme Court in J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB212 addressed a related issue.
In this case, the employer argued that it did not have to negotiate portions of
a collective agreement because employees were already covered by lawful
individual employment contracts.213 Again, the Court held that individual
employment contracts could not be used as grounds to waive rights
protected by the NLRA.214 Here, because the collective bargaining process
was mandated by the NLRA, access to it could not be waived in individual
employment contracts, even if an individual employee received some
benefits by bargaining individually.215 As in National Licorice, the Court
emphasized the critical nature of the NLRA as a public law protecting
public rights.216 Thus, “[w]herever private contracts conflict with [the
NLRA’s] functions, they obviously must yield or the [NLRA] would be
reduced to a futility.”217
Subsequently, the Board has ordered employers to cease and desist from
maintaining employment agreements that explicitly restrict Section 7
activity or have the effect of chilling Section 7 activity.218 Furthermore, the
206. Id. at 355.
207. Id. at 360.
208. See id. at 351.
209. Id. at 361.
210. Id. at 364.
211. Id.
212. 321 U.S. 332 (1944).
213. See id. at 334.
214. Id. at 339.
215. See id. at 336.
216. Id. at 337 (citing Nat’l Licorice Co., 309 U.S. at 364).
217. Id.
218. See Martin Luther Mem’l Home, 343 N.L.R.B. 646, 646–47 (2004) (citations
omitted) (“[O]ur inquiry into whether the maintenance of a challenged rule is unlawful
begins with the issue of whether the rule explicitly restricts activities protected by Section 7.
If it does, we will find the rule unlawful. If the rule does not explicitly restrict activity
protected by Section 7, the violation is dependent upon a showing of one of the following:
(1) employees would reasonably construe the language to prohibit Section 7 activity; (2) the
rule was promulgated in response to union activity; or (3) the rule has been applied to restrict
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Supreme Court has held that courts cannot enforce contracts that violate the
NLRA because they are illegal agreements.219 While the NLRB has
primary jurisdiction to determine if an agreement violates Sections 7 and 8,
federal courts must at all times refuse to enforce contracts if they are found
to violate federal law.220
II. RECONCILING THE FAA AND NLRA: THE ENFORCEABILITY OF CLASS
WAIVERS IN EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS
The issue to be analyzed in the balance of this Note is whether, given the
Board’s ruling in D.R. Horton that invoking classwide procedures is a form
of concerted activity protected under Section 7 of the NLRA,221 employers
can require, as a condition of employment, an agreement to arbitrate all
future disputes on an individual basis. The stakes are high. A recent paper
found that the prevalence of predispute arbitration agreements in
employment contracts has increased markedly in recent decades, paralleling
increased judicial acceptance.222 Studies conducted in the early to mid1990s found that between 2.1 percent and 9.9 percent of employers had
adopted arbitration agreements; by the late 1990s and 2000s the reported
range increased to between 14.1 percent and 22.7 percent.223 Arbitration
agreements have been estimated to cover at least thirty million employees,
and commentators believe this number will continue to rise.224
Furthermore, in light of Stolt-Nielsen and Concepcion, there is concern that
employers can have a sort of “get out of jail free” card by including class
waivers as part of arbitration agreements,225 or even simply by leaving the
arbitration agreement silent as to the use of class proceedings.226

the exercise of Section 7 rights.”); Lafayette Park Hotel, 326 N.L.R.B. 824, 825 (1998)
(“Where the rules are likely to have a chilling effect on Section 7 rights, the Board may
conclude that their maintenance is an unfair labor practice, even absent evidence of
enforcement.”).
219. See Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Mullins, 455 U.S. 72, 86 (1982) (“While only the Board
may provide affirmative remedies for unfair labor practices, a court may not enforce a
contract provision which violates § 8(e) [of the NLRA].”).
220. See id. at 83–84 (“‘The power of the federal courts to enforce the terms of private
agreements is at all times exercised subject to the restrictions and limitations of the public
policy of the United States as manifested in . . . federal statutes. . . . Where the enforcement
of private agreements would be violative of that policy, it is the obligation of courts to
refrain from such exertions of judicial power.’” (quoting Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24, 34–35
(1948))).
221. See supra Part I.D.3.
222. See Alexander J.S. Colvin, Empirical Research on Employment Arbitration: Clarity
Amidst the Sound and Fury, 11 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 405, 411 (2007); see also
Rutledge, supra note 48, at 555 (“Surveys similarly show that . . . a growing number of
employers and companies are using arbitration clauses.”); Weston, supra note 29, at 772
(“Arbitration provisions became standard in employment contracts after . . . Gilmer.”).
223. See Colvin, supra note 222, at 408–10.
224. Ruan, supra note 7, at 22.
225. See Weston, supra note 29, at 770, 776; see also Theodore Eisenberg et al.,
Arbitration’s Summer Soldiers: An Empirical Study of Arbitration Clauses in Consumer and
Nonconsumer Contracts, 41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 871, 895 (2008) (concluding that
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While the potential conflict between Section 7 NLRA rights and the FAA
has been considered in academic literature,227 the NLRB first squarely
addressed the issue only recently in the latter portion of its D.R. Horton
opinion.228 In addition to holding that classwide proceedings are a form of
concerted activity protected by Section 7, the Board also held that D.R.
Horton’s arbitration agreement interfered with the employee’s Section 7
right and ordered D.R. Horton to modify its arbitration agreement.229 The
Board ruled that refusing to enforce the arbitration agreement’s class waiver
did not create a conflict with the FAA230 and, even if it did, that the FAA
must yield to the NLRA.231
Subsequent to the Board’s ruling in D.R. Horton, courts throughout the
country have ruled on the same issue of employment arbitration agreements
containing class waivers. While one federal court agreed with the Board’s
analysis and declared an arbitration class waiver unenforceable,232 many
other courts have declined to follow the Board’s reasoning and have
enforced class waivers.233 This part lays out the arguments made by both
sides of the debate to establish a clearer picture of the conflict as it currently
stands. Part II.A presents in greater detail the Board’s rationale in D.R.
Horton and the federal court that followed its holding. Part II.B explores
the opinions rejecting D.R. Horton and holding class waivers enforceable.
A. The NLRB and a Federal Court Refuse To Enforce Class Waivers
After concluding that pursuit of classwide employment-related claims is
a protected Section 7 activity,234 the Board in D.R. Horton made two
further rulings. First, D.R. Horton’s employment agreement violated
Section 8 of NLRA by “‘interfer[ing] with, restrain[ing], or coerc[ing]

arbitration clauses are often used in consumer contracts to preclude aggregate consumer
action, not to promote fairness and efficiency).
226. See Terry F. Moritz & Brandon J. Fitch, The Future of Consumer Arbitration in
Light of Stolt-Nielsen, 23 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 265, 270 (2011) (stating that after StoltNielsen, “[a] court cannot compel class arbitration without a contractual basis for concluding
that the parties agreed to it; and presumably no potential defendant would agree to it”).
227. See, e.g., Hodges, supra note 165; Kenneth T. Lopatka, A Critical Perspective on the
Interplay Between Our Federal Labor and Arbitration Laws, 63 S.C. L. REV. 43 (2011);
John B. O’Keefe, Note, Preserving Collective-Action Rights in Employment Arbitration, 91
VA. L. REV. 823 (2005).
228. D.R. Horton, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. No. 184, 2012 WL 36274, at *4 (Jan. 3, 2012).
229. Id. at *17–18.
230. Id. at *10–15.
231. Id. at *16.
232. See Herrington v. Waterstone Mortg. Corp., No. 11-cv-779-bbc, 2012 WL 1242318
(W.D. Wis. Mar. 16, 2012).
233. See Delock v. Securitas Sec. Servs. USA, Inc., No. 4:11-cv-520-DPM, 2012 WL
3150391 (E.D. Ark. Aug. 1, 2012); Jasso v. Money Mart Express, Inc., 879 F. Supp. 2d 1038
(N.D. Cal. 2012); Morvant v. P.F. Chang’s China Bistro, 870 F. Supp. 2d 831 (N.D. Cal.
2012); Nelsen v. Legacy Partners Residential, Inc., 144 Cal. Rptr. 3d 198 (Ct. App. 2012);
Iskanian v. CLS Transp. L.A., LLC, 142 Cal. Rptr. 3d 372 (Ct. App. 2012), appeal docketed,
147 Cal. Rptr. 3d 324 (Cal. Sept. 19, 2012).
234. See supra Part I.D.3.
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employees in the exercise of a right guaranteed’” by Section 7.235 Citing
National Licorice236 and J.I. Case,237 the Board held it unlawful for D.R.
Horton to include a term in its employment agreement that restricted a
Section 7 right by requiring employees to pursue claims against their
employer only individually.238
Second, the Board addressed the more critical question: is this ruling
consistent with the FAA, particularly in light of the Supreme Court’s ruling
in Concepcion? The Board held that it was and provided four justifications.
First, the Board reasoned that declaring D.R. Horton’s employment
agreement unlawful does not conflict with the FAA and its underlying
concern about judicial or administrative bodies failing to put private
arbitration agreements “‘upon the same footing as other contracts.’”239
Under J.I. Case, any private contract that conflicts with the NLRA is
unlawful, so invalidation of D.R. Horton’s arbitration agreement treats it no
worse than any other private contract that infringes upon a protected
activity.240 Unlike in Concepcion, invalidation of the class waiver does not
rest on “‘defenses that apply only to arbitration or that derive their meaning
from the fact that an agreement to arbitrate is at issue.’”241
Second, the Board concluded that its ruling does not conflict with the
FAA, because D.R. Horton’s arbitration agreement waives employees’
substantive Section 7 right.242 The FAA does not compel enforcement of
an arbitration agreement that requires a party to “‘forgo the substantive
rights afforded by the statute.’”243 Indeed, the Board determined, “the
intent of the FAA was to leave substantive rights undisturbed.”244 The
Board wrote that the Section 7 right to bring a class or collective action is
substantive, not procedural, because “[t]he right to engage in collective
action—including collective legal action—is the core substantive right
protected by the NLRA and is the foundation on which the Act and Federal
labor policy rest.”245 While the Board acknowledged that class action rules
such as Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 are procedural, “the Section 7
right to act concertedly by invoking Rule 23, Section 216(b) [of the Fair
Labor Standards Act (FLSA)],246 or other legal procedures is not.”247
235. D.R. Horton, 2012 WL 36274, at *5 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (2006)).
236. See supra notes 205–11 and accompanying text.
237. See supra notes 212–17 and accompanying text.
238. D.R. Horton, 2012 WL 36274, at *5; see also supra Part I.D.4.
239. D.R. Horton, 2012 WL 36274, at *11 (quoting Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane
Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991)); see supra notes 90–101 and accompanying text.
240. D.R. Horton, 2012 WL 36274, at *11.
241. Id. at *11 (quoting AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1746
(2011)).
242. Id. at *12.
243. Id. (quoting Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991)).
244. Id. at *13.
245. Id. at *12.
246. Section 216(b) of the FLSA creates a procedural mechanism similar to that of a Rule
23 class action for enforcement of violations: “An action to recover . . . may be maintained
against any employer . . . by any one or more employees for and in behalf of himself or
themselves and other employees similarly situated.” 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2006).
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Third, the Board reasoned that prohibiting class waivers as violative of
the NLRA is consistent with the FAA because it falls under the FAA’s
Section 2 saving clause; arbitration agreements are properly invalidated if
based on “‘grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract.’”248 Here, enforcing an arbitration agreement that violates federal
employment law is against public policy—precisely the type of grounds
contemplated by the FAA for declaring an arbitration agreement
unenforceable under the saving clause.249
Fourth, even if declaring the agreement unenforceable does conflict with
the FAA, the Board determined that the FAA must yield to the NLRA.250
The Board cited the Norris-LaGuardia Act,251 which provides that a private
agreement is unenforceable if it seeks to prohibit a “‘lawful means [of]
aiding any person participating or interested in’ a lawsuit arising out of a
labor dispute.”252 The Norris-LaGuardia Act repealed “‘[a]ll acts and parts
of acts in conflict.’”253 Because it was passed seven years after the FAA,
the Board reasoned that the Norris-LaGuardia Act repealed the FAA to the
extent that it required the enforcement of arbitration agreements with class
waivers.254
For all of these reasons, the Board ordered D.R. Horton to cease and
desist from maintaining its employment agreement because it required
employees, as a condition of their employment,255 to waive the right to
maintain class or collective actions in all forums.256
247. D.R. Horton, 2012 WL 36274, at *12.
248. Id. at *11 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006)).
249. See id. at *14.
250. Id. at *16.
251. 29 U.S.C. §§ 101–115.
252. D.R. Horton, 2012 WL 36274, at *16 (alteration in original) (quoting 29 U.S.C.
§ 104(d)).
253. Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 115).
254. Id.
255. Id. at *17–18. An NLRB Administrative Law Judge has subsequently applied D.R.
Horton in holding that an employer violates Section 8 even where a class waiver can be
opted out of, and so it is not a mandatory condition of employment. See 24 Hour Fitness
USA, Inc., no. 20-CA-035419, 2012 WL 5495007 (NLRB Nov. 6, 2012) (“The requirement
that employees must affirmatively act to preserve rights already protected by Section 7 rights
through the opt-out process is . . . an unlawful burden on the right of employees to engage in
collective litigation that may arise in the future.”).
256. The Board made clear that D.R. Horton’s arbitration agreement was illegal because
it violated the NLRA, not because it violated the FLSA upon which Cuda’s claim of
misclassification was based. D.R. Horton, 2012 WL 36274, at *12 (“[T]he right allegedly
violated by [D.R. Horton’s arbitration agreement] is not the right to be paid the minimum
wage or overtime under the FLSA, but the right to engage in collective action under the
NLRA.”). Nonetheless, some courts rejecting D.R. Horton have incorrectly focused on the
rights protected by the FLSA rather than the NLRA. See Owen v. Bristol Care, Inc., 702
F.3d 1050, 1055 (8th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted) (“[G]iven the absence of
any contrary congressional command from the FLSA that a right to engage in class actions
overrides the mandate of the FAA in favor of arbitration, we reject Owen’s invitation to
follow the NLRB’s rationale in D.R. Horton.”); Cohen v. UBS Fin. Servs., Inc., No. 12 Civ.
2147 (BSJ)(JLC), 2012 WL 6041634, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 4, 2012) (citations omitted) (“To
the extent that Plaintiffs rely on . . . D.R. Horton . . . for the proposition that ‘a waiver of the
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Several months later, in Herrington v. Waterstone Mortgage Corp.,257 a
federal court in Wisconsin applied D.R. Horton in refusing to enforce a
class waiver in an employment arbitration agreement. Plaintiff Pamela
Herrington brought a claim against her employer for failing to provide
overtime pay as required under the FLSA.258 The defendant moved to
dismiss or stay the case under the terms of the parties’ arbitration
agreement, which required all employment disputes be resolved in
arbitration, and “[s]uch arbitration may not be joined with or join or include
any claims by any persons not party to this Agreement.”259 Herrington
argued that, consistent with D.R. Horton, the arbitration agreement was
unenforceable because it required her to give up her right under the NLRA
to pursue a classwide claim.260
The court first noted that, under Supreme Court precedent, rulings by the
Board are entitled to “the greatest deference” and should be followed if
The court then followed the Board’s
“reasonably defensible.”261
interpretation of the NLRA that collective actions are protected Section 7
activities.262 The court agreed with the Board that the NLRA provides a
substantive right that cannot be waived as a condition of employment.263
Thus, refusing to enforce the class waiver does not conflict with Gilmer,
which does not mandate enforcement of an agreement that requires waiver
of substantive rights,264 or Concepcion, which is distinguishable because it
did not deal with a substantive right protected by a federal statute.265 The
court found the Board’s interpretation of the NLRA in D.R. Horton
“reasonably defensible” and invalidated the class waiver in the arbitration
agreement.266

right to proceed collectively under the FLSA is unenforceable as a matter of law,’ this Court
. . . declines to follow these decisions.”).
257. No. 11-cv-779-bbc, 2012 WL 1242318 (W.D. Wis. Mar. 16, 2012).
258. Id. at *1.
259. Id.
260. Id. at *2.
261. Id. at *5 (quoting ABF Freight Sys., Inc. v. NLRB, 510 U.S. 317, 324 (1994); SureTan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 891 (1984)).
262. Herrington, 2012 WL 1242318, at *5 (“Particularly because defendant develops no
argument that the Board has interpreted the NLRA incorrectly, I see no reason to question
the Board’s judgment in this instance.”).
263. Id. at *4.
264. See id.
265. See id. at *6.
266. Id. (quoting Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 891 (1984)). The court severed
the class waiver and stayed the case pending arbitration, primarily because neither party had
argued that class arbitration was improper for the resolution of the dispute. See id. at *7.
Very recently, a second federal court refused to enforce a class waiver based on a similar
substantive right rationale. Brown v. Citicorp Serv., Inc., No. 1:12-cv-00062-BLW, 2013
WL 645942, at *3 (D. Idaho Feb. 21, 2013) (revoking an employment arbitration agreement
by reasoning that the employer’s “arbitration agreement does more than merely waive [the
plaintiff’s] right to a procedural remedy; it bars her from asserting a substantive right that is
critical to national labor policy”).
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B. Federal and State Courts Enforce Class Waivers
Federal district courts in California267 and Arkansas268 and state courts of
appeal in California269 have recently enforced class waivers in employment
arbitration agreements.270 This section first provides a brief account of the
facts in each of these cases and then explores the overlapping reasoning of
these courts for enforcing class waivers and refusing to follow D.R. Horton.
In Jasso v. Money Mart Express, Inc.,271 Janelle Jasso brought a class
action in state court against her employer for violations of California labor
law relating to overtime pay, meal and rest breaks, reimbursement for
employment-related expenses, and penalties for late wage payments.272
Jasso had previously signed a predispute arbitration agreement that
contained a class waiver.273 Money Mart Express removed the case to
federal court and then moved to compel arbitration according to the terms
of their arbitration agreement.274 Rejecting D.R. Horton, the court held the
arbitration agreement and class waiver enforceable and stayed the case
pending arbitration.275
In Morvant v. P.F. Chang’s China Bistro, Inc.,276 Zachary Morvant and
Jean Andrews, former employees of a P.F. Chang’s restaurant, brought a
class action in state court against P.F. Chang’s for violating California labor
law by failing to provide meal and rest breaks, refusing to pay for missed
meal and rest breaks, failing to pay for overtime, and failing to provide
accurate wage statements.277 P.F. Chang’s removed the case to federal
267. See Jasso v. Money Mart Express, Inc., 879 F. Supp. 2d 1038 (N.D. Cal. 2012);
Morvant v. P.F. Chang’s China Bistro, Inc., 870 F. Supp. 2d 831 (N.D. Cal. 2012).
268. See Delock v. Securitas Sec. Servs. USA, Inc., No. 4:11-cv-520-DPM, 2012 WL
3150391 (E.D. Ark. Aug. 1, 2012).
269. See Nelsen v. Legacy Partners Residential, 144 Cal. Rptr. 3d 198 (Ct. App. 2012);
Iskanian v. CLS Transp. L.A., LLC, 142 Cal. Rptr. 3d 372 (Ct. App. 2012), appeal docketed,
147 Cal. Rptr. 3d 324 (Cal. Sept. 19, 2012).
270. While this section discusses only these five opinions, numerous other courts have
declined to follow D.R. Horton, often with reference to the opinions discussed here. See,
e.g., Long v. BDP Intern., Inc., No. H-12-1446, 2013 WL 245002, at *14 n.11 (S.D. Tex.
Jan. 22, 2013) (“Horton has been widely criticized and not followed by various of district
courts.”); Tenet HealthSystem Phila., Inc. v. Rooney, No. 12-mc-58, 2012 WL 3550496, at
*4 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 17, 2012) (declining to follow D.R. Horton in part because many district
courts “have declined to adopt its rationale altogether in the face of conflicting Supreme
Court precedent, statutory schemes, and questions over its precedential value”); Spears v.
Mid-America Waffles, Inc., No. 11-2273-CM, 2012 WL 2568157, at *2 (D. Kan. July 2,
2012) (finding that D.R. Horton is contrary to Concepcion); Outland v. Macy’s Dep’t Stores,
Inc., No. A133589, 2013 WL 164419, at *5 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 16, 2013) (discussing the
federal district courts that have rejected D.R. Horton); Papudesi v. Northrop Grumman
Corp., No. B235730, 2012 WL 5987550, at *7 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 29, 2012) (stating that the
NLRA does not contain a congressional command to override the FAA).
271. 879 F. Supp. 2d 1038 (N.D. Cal. 2012).
272. Id. at 1040.
273. Id. at 1041.
274. Id. at 1040.
275. Id. at 1052.
276. 870 F. Supp. 2d 831 (N.D. Cal. 2012).
277. Id. at 834.

2974

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 81

court and moved to compel arbitration per the terms of its arbitration
agreement, which contained a class waiver.278 The court denied P.F.
Chang’s motion to compel arbitration as to Morvant because he had never
signed the arbitration agreement.279 However, the court granted the motion
to compel arbitration as to Andrews,280 rejecting Andrews’s argument that
D.R. Horton rendered the arbitration agreement unenforceable.281
In Delock v. Securitas Security Services USA, Inc.,282 David Delock and
several others brought a class action in federal court against their employer
Securitas Security Services.283 Delock was a site supervisor and his
coplaintiffs were security guards.284 They alleged that Securitas violated
the FLSA and the Arkansas Minimum Wage Act by forcing them to work
off the clock.285 Securitas moved to stay the case pending arbitration,
arguing that the employees had agreed to an enforceable arbitration
agreement with a class waiver.286 In an initial order, the court held that the
employees had accepted the arbitration agreement and granted Securitas’s
motion to compel arbitration.287 However, the court wrote that it needed
more time to determine if the class waiver was enforceable in light of D.R.
Horton.288 In a later order, the court considered and rejected D.R. Horton
and enforced the class waiver.289
In Iskanian v. CLS Transportation Los Angeles LLC,290 plaintiff Arshavir
Iskanian, a driver employed by CLS Transportation, brought a class action
in state court against CLS, alleging violation of California law for failure to
pay overtime, provide meal and rest breaks, reimburse business expenses,
provide accurate and complete wage statements, and pay final wages in a
timely manner.291 He had previously signed CLS’s arbitration agreement
containing a class waiver.292 The trial court found in favor of CLS and

278. Id. at 835.
279. Id. at 836–37.
280. The parties agreed that Andrews had accepted P.F. Chang’s arbitration agreement.
Id. at 837.
281. Id. at 845 (“[T]he inclusion of a class action waiver provides no basis to hold the
Arbitration Agreement unenforceable . . . .”).
282. No. 4:11-CV-520-DPM, 2012 WL 1066378 (E.D. Ark. Mar. 29, 2012).
283. Id. at *1.
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. Id. at *3.
288. Id. at *4.
289. Delock v. Securitas Sec. Servs. USA, Inc., No. 4:11-CV-520-DPM, 2012 WL
3150391, at *4 (E.D. Ark. Aug. 1, 2012) (“The Court declines to endorse, however, the
Board’s application of the Federal Arbitration Act or its reading of the precedent applying
that Act.”).
290. 142 Cal. Rptr. 3d 372 (Ct. App. 2012), appeal docketed, No. S204032 (Cal. Sept. 19,
2012).
291. Id. at 375–76.
292. Id.
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granted the motion to compel arbitration.293 The court of appeal affirmed
the ruling.294
Finally, in Nelsen v. Legacy Partners Residential, Inc.,295 Lorena Nelsen,
a former property manager for Legacy Partners Residential, brought a class
action against Legacy, alleging violations of the California Labor Code.296
Nelsen had previously accepted an arbitration agreement with a class
waiver, and Legacy moved to compel arbitration.297 The trial court granted
Legacy’s motion and ordered individual arbitration,298 and the court of
appeal affirmed.299
All of these courts enforced employment arbitration agreements with
class waivers, and each explicitly rejected D.R. Horton. Similar and
overlapping reasoning was used throughout. These courts largely accepted
the Board’s interpretation of the NLRA that use of class proceedings is
protected under Section 7, and therefore their inclusion in arbitration
agreements violates the NLRA.300 The primary point of contention, rather,
was whether enforcing the NLRA here conflicts with the FAA and, if so,
how to resolve the conflict. To answer this question, several courts noted
that a decision by the Board interpreting a statute other than the NLRA
(here the FAA) is not entitled to judicial deference or the “reasonably
defensible”301 standard applied in Herrington.302 Particularly because the
NLRB has “no special competence or experience in interpreting the Federal
Arbitration Act,” the analysis is more searching and critical than that
undertaken in the case of the NLRB’s interpretation of the NLRA.303
Under this standard of review, these courts all held that refusing to
enforce a class waiver that violates Section 7 creates a conflict with the
FAA. The primary justification was that the presumed remedy—
compelling class arbitration absent the parties’ consent—conflicts with the
underlying purpose of the FAA to enforce arbitration agreements as
written.304 The focus is on “the broad language in Concepcion which
293. Id. at 376.
294. Id. at 388.
295. 144 Cal. Rptr. 3d 198 (Ct. App. 2012).
296. Id. at 202–03.
297. Id.
298. Id. at 215–16.
299. Id. at 216.
300. See Delock v. Securitas Sec. Servs. USA, Inc., No. 4:11-CV-520-DPM, 2012 WL
3150391, at *4 (E.D. Ark. Aug. 1, 2012) (“This conclusion is a reasonable reading of the
statute.”); Jasso v. Money Mart Express, Inc., 879 F. Supp. 2d 1038, 1047 (N.D. Cal. 2012)
(citing J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 337 (1944); National Licorice Co. v. NLRB,
309 U.S. 350, 360, 364 (1940)); Iskanian, 142 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 381. But see Nelsen, 144 Cal.
Rptr. 3d at 213 (“The Board’s decision reflects a novel interpretation of section 7 and the
FAA.”).
301. See supra note 261 and accompanying text.
302. See Delock, 2012 WL 3150391, at *3; Nelsen, 144 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 213; Iskanian,
142 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 381–82.
303. See DeLock, 2012 WL 3150391, at *3.
304. See id. at *2; Jasso, 879 F. Supp. 2d at 1048; Morvant v. P.F. Chang’s China Bistro,
Inc., 870 F. Supp. 2d 831, 842 (N.D. Cal. 2012); Iskanian, 142 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 380.
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articulates a strong policy choice in favor of enforcing arbitration
agreements and thereupon holds that class waiver provisions should not be
stricken or render the agreements unenforceable.”305 Under both StoltNielsen and Concepcion, class arbitration cannot be compelled absent clear
intent.306
Because they found a conflict between the NLRA and the FAA, these
courts applied CompuCredit’s “contrary congressional command” test to
determine if the NLRA should overrule the FAA.307 Because the NLRA
does not contain a command in its text or legislative history requiring the
availability of classwide claims, class waivers in employment arbitration
agreements must be enforced in accordance with the FAA.308 Even if there
is a right under the NLRA to classwide proceedings, it gives way to the
FAA when waived in an arbitration agreement.
Courts also rejected D.R. Horton’s conclusion that the Norris-LaGuardia
Act overrides the FAA’s mandate to enforce illegal arbitration
agreements.309 As with the FAA, the Board’s interpretation of the NorrisLaGuardia Act is not entitled to judicial deference, because the Board is
interpreting a statute other than the NLRA.310 The Norris-LaGuardia Act is
inapplicable to the enforceability of class waivers, these courts reasoned,
because it applies only to infringements on joining or withdrawing from
labor organizations.311 Even if it was applicable, courts concluded that the
Norris-LaGuardia Act, like the NLRA, contains no CompuCredit “contrary
congressional command” overriding the FAA.312 Finally, D.R. Horton’s
implied repeal claim—that the Norris-LaGuardia Act overrules the FAA
because it was enacted later—also fails because “[t]hough Congress first
enacted the FAA in 1925, it reenacted the statute in 1947—after passing the
Norris-LaGuardia Act and reenacting the NLRA.”313 Accordingly, courts
held that the Board erred in “concluding that the FAA had to give way
305. Jasso, 879 F. Supp. 2d at 1048.
306. See Morvant, 870 F. Supp. 2d at 842.
307. See Delock, 2012 WL 3150391, at *5; Jasso, 879 F. Supp. 2d at 1045–46; Morvant,
870 F. Supp. 2d at 845; Nelsen, 144 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 214; Iskanian, 142 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 382;
see also supra notes 102–12 and accompanying text. CompuCredit was decided after D.R.
Horton and so was not discussed in the Board’s opinion.
308. See Delock, 2012 WL 3150391, at *5 (“The NLRA’s text contains no command that
is contrary to enforcing the FAA’s mandate.”); Jasso, 879 F. Supp. 2d at 1047; Morvant, 870
F. Supp. 2d at 845 (“Because Congress did not expressly provide that it was overriding any
provision in the FAA when it enacted the NLRA . . . the Court cannot read such a provision
into [the NLRA].”); Nelsen, 144 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 214 (“[T]here is no language in the NLRA
. . . demonstrating that Congress intended the employee concerted action rights therein to
override the mandate of the FAA.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Iskanian, 142 Cal.
Rptr. 3d at 382 (“The D.R. Horton decision identified no ‘congressional command’ in the
NLRA prohibiting enforcement of an arbitration agreement pursuant to its terms.”).
309. See Delock, 2012 WL 3150391, at *5–6; Jasso, 879 F. Supp. 2d at 1047; Morvant,
870 F. Supp. 2d at 843–44.
310. See Morvant, 870 F. Supp. 2d at 843.
311. Id. at 843–44 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 103(a)–(b) (2006)).
312. See Jasso, 879 F. Supp. 2d at 1049; Morvant, 870 F. Supp. 2d at 843.
313. Delock, 2012 WL 3150391, at *5.
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because of when Congress had enacted [the NLRA and the NorrisLaGuardia Act].”314
III. THE SUBSTANTIVE RIGHT SOLUTION
As detailed in Part II, the NLRB and courts have split on whether to
enforce class waivers in employment arbitration agreements. Courts that
enforced class waivers focused primarily on the policy, articulated in
Concepcion, of enforcing arbitration agreements according to their terms in
the absence of a contrary congressional command in the NLRA, as required
by CompuCredit, to overcome this policy.315 This part argues that this
application of Concepcion and CompuCredit fails to consider a critical
distinguishing feature of Section 7 rights. While the plaintiffs in
Concepcion sought class proceedings as a procedural right, class
proceedings are protected by the NLRA as a substantive right. The
Supreme Court’s interpretation of the FAA has never mandated the
enforcement of arbitration agreements that interfere with substantive rights.
While the Board discussed this point in D.R. Horton, its justification was
lacking.316 Those courts critical of D.R. Horton failed to address this
argument.
This part fills the void left by the NLRB and courts by providing a more
thorough analysis of the distinction between substantive and procedural
rights. The Supreme Court has rich precedent distinguishing between
substantive and procedural rules for purposes of choice of law in federal
courts. Because similar concerns are implicated in rights that arise in
choice of law as in rights that relate to the enforceability of arbitration
agreements, understanding how the line between substance and procedure is
drawn in the former can aid in determining how to properly draw the line in
the latter.
Part III.A reviews the distinction between substantive and procedural
rules for determining choice of law in federal courts. Part III.B explores
how courts use similar considerations in determining whether or not to
enforce aspects of arbitration agreements. Part III.C applies this framework
to the right under the NLRA to invoke classwide proceedings and concludes
that this right is a substantive right. Because the right is substantive, it
cannot be waived in an employment arbitration agreement, a conclusion in
full accord with the Court’s FAA jurisprudence.

314. Id.
315. See supra Part II.B.
316. See D.R. Horton, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. No. 184, 2012 WL 36274, at *5, *12 (Jan. 3,
2012) (reasoning that the D.R. Horton’s arbitration agreement “clearly and expressly bars
employees from exercising substantive rights that have long been held protected by Section
7 of the NLRA” and rejecting the claim that “the Section 7 right to bring a class or collective
action is merely ‘procedural’”).
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A. The Substance/Procedure Dichotomy for Choice of Law
When a federal court serves as the forum for the adjudication of state law
claims by exercising its diversity jurisdiction,317 the court must determine
whether to apply state or federal law. The Erie doctrine answers this
question.318 In Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,319 the question for the
Supreme Court was whether, in determining the duty of care owed by a
railroad company to a pedestrian walking alongside the track, a federal
court adjudicating the claim was required to apply Pennsylvania tort law.320
The Court held that, where no constitutional provision or federal statute
applied, the federal court must apply relevant Pennsylvania tort law rather
than general federal common law.321 When sitting in diversity jurisdiction
the federal courts must apply the substantive law of the relevant state,322 as
mandated both by the Rules of Decision Act323 and by the Constitution
itself.324
The Supreme Court soon acknowledged the difficulty in determining
whether a state law is “substantive,” and thus must be applied in federal
court. In Guaranty Trust Co. v. York,325 the question was whether a state
statute of limitations that had run barred a federal court from adjudicating
the underlying claim.326 In other words, is a statute of limitations a
“substantive” or “procedural” rule?327 The Court’s answer was not based
on whether the state law is “deemed a matter of ‘procedure’ in some
sense.”328 Rather, a law is procedural if it “concerns merely the manner
and the means by which a right to recover . . . is enforced,” and substantive
if it would “significantly affect the result of a litigation for a federal court to
disregard [the state law].”329 Because the state statute of limitations is
317. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (“The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases . . .
between Citizens of different States.”).
318. For a more detailed account of the Erie doctrine and its underlying rationales, see
Joseph P. Bauer, Shedding Light on Shady Grove: Further Reflections on the Erie Doctrine
From a Conflicts Perspective, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 939, 941–49 (2011).
319. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
320. Id. at 69–70. The claim was brought in federal court for the Southern District of
New York. However, because the accident in dispute occurred in Pennsylvania, its tort law
would govern if any state law governed at all.
321. Id. at 80.
322. Id. at 78 (“Congress has no power to declare substantive rules of common law
applicable in a State whether they be local in their nature or ‘general,’ be they commercial
law or a part of the law of torts. And no clause in the Constitution purports to confer such a
power upon the federal courts.”).
323. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2006) (“The laws of the several states, except where the
Constitution or treaties of the United States or Acts of Congress otherwise require or
provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in civil actions in the courts of the United
States, in cases where they apply.”).
324. Erie, 304 U.S. at 80 (holding that in failing to apply state law, lower courts have
“invaded rights which in our opinion are reserved by the Constitution to the several States”).
325. 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
326. Id. at 109.
327. Id.
328. Id.
329. Id.
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“outcome determinative” in the sense that it would completely bar recovery
had the suit been brought in state court, it is deemed a substantive state rule
that must be applied by the federal court.330 Thus, the plaintiff’s claim was
barred in federal court by the application of the state statute of
limitations.331
The distinction between “substantive” and “procedural” rules is also
implicated when a federal court must determine whether to apply a state law
that appears to clash with a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure. Under the
Rules Enabling Act332 (REA), the Supreme Court is empowered to
prescribe “general rules of practice and procedure and rules of evidence for
cases in the United States district courts . . . and courts of appeals,” on the
condition that “[s]uch rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any
substantive right.”333 As the Court stated in Hanna v. Plumer,334 the broad
command of the Erie doctrine is identical to that of the REA: “[F]ederal
courts are to apply state substantive law and federal procedural law.”335 A
rule is valid under the REA only if it is “procedural” and, if so, it trumps
any conflicting state procedural rules in federal court.
To determine whether a rule is procedural, the Hanna Court provided a
refined account of the somewhat simplistic Guaranty Trust “outcome
determinative” test: “The test must be whether a rule really regulates
procedure, the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by
substantive law and for justly administering remedy and redress for
disregard or infraction of them.”336 Applying this test, the Court held that
Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which prescribes the proper
manner of service of summons, is procedural because it relates only to the
“practice and procedure of the district courts.”337 The rule was not
substantive even though the Court acknowledged that the ways in which it
differs from state rules may in some cases be outcome determinative.338
Recently in Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, P.A. v. Allstate
Insurance Co.,339 the Supreme Court affirmed in a plurality opinion that the
dividing line between “substance” and “procedure” when analyzing a
Federal Rule (and thus the validity of the rule itself) is whether the rule
“really regulate[s] procedure.”340 For the plurality, “[t]he test is not
whether the rule affects a litigant’s substantive rights; most procedural rules

330. Id. at 110.
331. Id. at 112.
332. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2006).
333. Id.
334. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
335. Id. at 465.
336. Id. at 464 (quoting Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
337. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
338. Id. at 468.
339. 130 S. Ct. 1431 (2010).
340. Id. at 1442 (quoting Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
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do.”341 Rather, the distinction is based on what the rule itself regulates:
procedural rules valid under the REA govern only “the manner and the
means by which the litigants’ rights are enforced”; substantive rules invalid
under the REA alter “‘the rules of decision by which [the] court will
Substantive rules “alter the rights
adjudicate [those] rights.’”342
themselves, the available remedies, or the rules of decision by which the
court adjudicate[s] either.”343 Understanding substantive rules as those that
alter “the rights themselves” is vital to the analysis to come below.
Shady Grove also provides a second important point. The particular
question before the Court was whether Rule 23 of the FRCP which, as
discussed above, provides the conditions upon which a class action may be
maintained, is procedural and thus valid under the REA.344 Applying its
newly articulated test, the Court held that Rule 23 is valid because, like
other forms of joinder, a class action “merely enables a federal court to
adjudicate claims of multiple parties at once, instead of in separate suits.”345
A class action is procedural because it “leaves the parties’ legal rights and
duties intact and the rules of decision unchanged,” even if it has significant
“incidental effect[s]” on the likelihood or nature of claims that it enables.346
Thus, for purposes of Erie choice of law analysis, use of class actions is a
procedural, not substantive, right.
B. The Substance/Procedure Dichotomy and Arbitration Agreements
A similar analysis in distinguishing substance and procedure implicitly
guides courts’ determination as to whether to enforce terms in arbitration
agreements. Both an agreement to submit a claim to arbitration and a
decision to remove a state claim to federal court are choices of forum for
resolution of disputes.347 Predispute arbitration agreements serve as a
“specialized kind of forum-selection clause” that set both “the situs of the
suit but also the procedure to be used in resolving the dispute.”348
Similarly, removal to federal court changes the site of the suit and results in
the implementation of federal procedural rules.349 Unsurprisingly then, the
Supreme Court’s increasing acceptance of procedural modifications through
both forum selection clauses and arbitration agreements have developed in
tandem in recent decades.350 As is true for the FRCP, arbitration
341. Id.
342. Id. (quoting Miss. Publ’g Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 446 (1946)).
343. Id. at 1443.
344. Id. at 1442; see also supra notes 29–38 and accompanying text.
345. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1443.
346. Id.
347. See supra Part I.A.
348. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 519 (1974).
349. See Richard A. Nagareda, The Litigation-Arbitration Dichotomy Meets the Class
Action, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1069, 1091–93 (2011) (discussing the “Hanna-like quality
to the Court’s FAA decisions”).
350. See supra Part I.C.3; Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 593–94
(1991) (explaining the benefits of forum selection clauses).
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agreements are valid and enforceable because they modify only the
procedural rights of the parties, the “‘manner and the means by which the
litigants’ rights are enforced.’”351
Where an arbitration agreement modifies only the procedure of
adjudicating a dispute, courts with increasing stringency enforce the
agreement pursuant to the FAA.352 Typical examples of procedural rights
that can be modified through an arbitration agreement are the scope of
discovery353 and rules of evidence,354 as these leave the rights themselves
that are being adjudicated unaffected. The same is generally true for
predispute agreements to arbitrate a statutory claim. By agreeing to
arbitration, “a party does not forgo the substantive rights afforded by the
statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a
judicial, forum.”355 If an arbitration agreement only changes the forum in
which a dispute is resolved, then the FAA mandates that a reviewing court
enforce the agreement as written.356 Accordingly, the Supreme Court has
held that a predispute agreement to arbitrate does not interfere with a
party’s ability to bring substantive claims under antitrust,357 securities,358
age discrimination,359 or misrepresentations in advertising statutes;360 the
substantive claim is adjudicated through the agreed upon arbitration
procedures rather than standard judicial procedures.
However, where terms of an arbitration agreement do interfere with
substantive rights of the parties, courts have declared the terms
unenforceable and have either severed the offending clauses or invalidated
the entire arbitration agreement. For example, because Title VII provides
for statutory punitive damages, parties cannot agree to ban such damages
for Title VII claims brought in arbitration.361 The same is true for punitive
351. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1442 (quoting Miss. Publ’g Corp. v. Murphree, 325 U.S.
438, 446 (1946)); see supra notes 339–43 and accompanying text. That the FAA was not
intended to require the enforcement of arbitration agreements that interfere with substantive
legal rights is evidenced in the writings of Julius Henry Cohen, a primary drafter of the FAA.
See Hall St. Assocs. L.L.C. v. Mattel, 552 U.S. 576, 589 n.7 (2008). Cohen wrote a
companion article explaining that, under the FAA, “[w]hen the agreement to arbitrate is
made, it is not left outside the law. Proceedings under the new arbitration law are as much a
part of our legal system as any other special proceeding or form of remedy.” Julius Henry
Cohen & Kenneth Dayton, The New Federal Arbitration Law, 12 VA. L. REV. 265, 279
(1926). Agreements to arbitrate provide parties with a different forum but cannot leave them
“outside the law.” Id.
352. See supra Part I.C.3.
353. See supra note 20 and accompanying text; see also Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson
Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 31 (1991) (holding that an arbitration agreement is enforceable
even if discovery “procedures might not be as extensive as in the federal courts”).
354. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
355. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628
(1985); see supra notes 68–82 and accompanying text.
356. See supra notes 90–101 and accompanying text.
357. See supra notes 68–82 and accompanying text.
358. See supra notes 83–89 and accompanying text.
359. See supra notes 90–101 and accompanying text.
360. See supra notes 102–12 and accompanying text.
361. See Hadnot v. Bay, Ltd., 344 F.3d 474, 478 n.14 (5th Cir. 2003).
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damages permissible under the D.C. Human Rights Act362 and treble
damages in federal antitrust claims.363 In all of these, enforcing the
arbitration agreement would displace a statutory remedy, a substantive
component of the statute.364 Refusing to enforce such agreements is
consistent with the Supreme Court dicta in Mitsubishi and Gilmer that
clauses in arbitration agreements that interfere with statutory rights or
remedies are invalid.365 Thus, while a party can be bound to resolve a Title
VII employment dispute in arbitration rather than in court, previously
agreed upon limits on damages must be lifted to allow the underlying
statute to “function fully and adequately under the law.”366
The Supreme Court undertook this process of disentangling substantive
and procedural components of a statute in Rodriguez de Quijas.367 The
Court enforced waiver through arbitration of “procedural components” of
the Securities Act, which included provisions regarding federal venue,
service of process, and removal requirements.368 However, the Court
implied that it would not have enforced a waiver of the burden-of-proof
stipulation, as that is a substantive component of the statute.369 The
differentiation seems to closely track Shady Grove, as waiver of procedural
components of the statute would alter “‘the manner and the means by which
the litigants’ rights are enforced,’” while waiver of substantive components
would alter “‘the rules of decision by which the court . . . adjudicate[s].’”370
Thus, the Shady Grove framework is a logical way to analyze the
enforceability of class waivers in employment arbitration agreements.
C. The Substantive Nature of Class Proceedings As Protected by the NLRA
The final step is to apply this framework to determine if employees’ right
to invoke classwide proceedings is a procedural right that can be
enforceably waived under the FAA or a substantive right that cannot be
enforceably waived in predispute arbitration agreements. Underlying the
analysis is the Supreme Court’s holding in Shady Grove that use of Rule 23
to bring a class action is a procedural, not a substantive, right.371 Rule 23
and use of class actions more generally are procedural rights because they
“leave[] the parties’ legal rights and duties intact and the rules of decision
unchanged.”372 The Court in Concepcion similarly viewed class arbitration

362. See Booker v. Robert Half Int’l, Inc., 413 F.3d 77, 83 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
363. See Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25, 48 (1st Cir. 2006).
364. See supra note 343 and accompanying text.
365. See supra notes 82, 100–01 and accompanying text.
366. Hadnot, 344 F.3d at 478.
367. See supra notes 83–89 and accompanying text.
368. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
369. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
370. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1442
(2010) (quoting Miss. Publ’g Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 446 (1946)).
371. See supra notes 344–46 and accompanying text.
372. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1443.
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as a procedural right that cannot be forced on a party absent explicit
agreement, akin to altering the rules of discovery or evidence.373
However, unlike Rule 23 and other class mechanisms meant simply to
aggregate similar claims, the nature of the right here is different. Viewed
through the Shady Grove framework, when employees seek to use
classwide proceedings as a form of collected activity for their mutual aid or
protection, the right is substantive, not procedural. This conclusion follows
from the NLRA itself. The discrete purpose of the NLRA is to strengthen
the ability of workers to organize through collective activities.374
Protection of employees’ ability to act collectively is the “fundamental
right” of the NLRA and “guarantees employees the most basic rights of
Because Section 7 rights are so
industrial self-determination.”375
fundamental, an individual employee cannot waive them contractually, even
if doing so would be to the individual employee’s benefit.376 The violation
of Section 7 and the harm to the employee occurs at the moment he is
presented with an employment agreement with an offending term, even if
he has suffered no subsequent harm by the employer and even if the
employer has made no attempt to enforce the illegal term.377
For these reasons, as a Section 7 right, an employee’s invocation of
classwide proceedings is not solely procedural as it was in Shady Grove; it
is not merely the “‘the manner and the means by which the litigants’ rights
are enforced.’”378 Invocation of classwide proceedings is the right. A class
waiver in an employment arbitration agreement interferes with a substantive
right—Section 7 protections are, in the words of Shady Grove, “the rights
themselves” for which a party seeks relief from the NLRB or the courts.379
As such, this right cannot be modified in a predispute arbitration agreement,
and attempts to do so (in the form of a class waiver) must not be enforced.
This conclusion is entirely consistent with the FAA jurisprudence
reviewed above. In Mitsubishi, Rodriguez de Quijas, and Gilmer,
enforcement of arbitration agreements did not conflict with the parties’
ability to seek relief for infringement of their statutory substantive rights for
antitrust, securities, and age discrimination violations.380 Here, however,
enforcement of the arbitration agreements, which requires waiving the use
of class proceedings, directly infringes the right being sought.381 As stated
in both Mitsubishi and Gilmer, arbitration agreements are unenforceable if
they interfere with substantive rights.382 In Stolt-Nielsen and Concepcion,
373. See supra notes 127–40 and accompanying text.
374. See supra notes 147–49 and accompanying text.
375. See supra notes 154, 156 and accompanying text.
376. See supra notes 212–17 and accompanying text.
377. See supra note 218 and accompanying text.
378. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allsate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1442
(2010) (quoting Miss. Publ’g Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 446 (1946)).
379. See supra note 343 and accompanying text.
380. See supra notes 68–101 and accompanying text.
381. See supra notes 127–204 and accompanying text.
382. See supra notes 82, 100–01 and accompanying text.
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the plaintiffs’ desired use of classwide proceedings was a procedural right
because the plaintiffs sought it as a means of expediting or vindicating other
substantive rights.383 Accordingly, in both, the Court considered whether
this change in procedure was appropriate given the agreement of the
parties.384 Here, however, class proceedings are the substantive right
protected by statute and, indeed, there is no other substantive right that the
NLRA serves to protect. Just as under the Erie doctrine, removal to federal
court should not upset the substantive rules of the states, use of arbitration
rather than the courts should not upset the substantive rights of employees.
In accordance with the NLRA, employers cannot use an agreement to
arbitrate as a means of denying employees their substantive right to employ
classwide proceedings for the resolution of a dispute.
Understanding the Section 7 right as substantive rather than procedural
resolves the criticisms raised by the courts that objected to the Board’s D.R.
Horton holding.385 Refusing to enforce class waivers in employment
contracts does not run afoul of the holding of Stolt-Nielsen or Concepcion
by creating a conflict with the FAA, because the FAA has never been held
to mandate the enforcement of arbitration agreements that waive
substantive rights.386 Rather, the cases consistently hold that parties can
and should use predispute arbitration agreements as a means of modifying
only their procedural rights, whether arising under federal statutes or not.
Furthermore, there is no conflict between the NLRA and the FAA because
refusing to enforce a class waiver does not require compelled class
arbitration.387 Rather, employers need only “leave[] open a judicial forum
for class and collective claims,”388 and so would not be compelled into a
type of arbitration with which they did not agree.389 Where there is no
conflict between the NLRA and the FAA, the CompuCredit “contrary
congressional command” test to resolve statutory conflict is irrelevant.390
Infringing a substantive right takes the enforceability of an arbitration
agreement outside of the FAA’s mandate and, as the Supreme Court has
consistently held, such agreements are unenforceable.

383. See supra notes 116–40 and accompanying text.
384. See supra notes 116–40 and accompanying text.
385. See supra notes 300–14 and accompanying text.
386. See supra notes 82, 100–01 and accompanying text.
387. Contra supra notes 304–06 and accompanying text.
388. D.R. Horton, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. No. 184, 2012 WL 36274, at *16 (Jan. 3, 2012).
389. This remedy differs from that in Herrington, in which the class waiver was severed
and the court permitted the use of class arbitration, likely due to ambiguity in the intent of
the parties. See supra note 266. However, given the strong language in Stolt-Nielsen and
Concepcion that nonconsensual class arbitration is inconsistent with the FAA, as a general
rule access to invocation of judicial class action, rather than class arbitration, is the proper
remedy. See D.R. Horton, 2012 WL 36274, at *16.
390. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION
Over the last few decades, the Supreme Court has interpreted the FAA to
afford great discretion in allowing parties to use arbitration agreements to
alter the procedural rules by which their disputes will be resolved.
Recently, the Court held that this discretion generally includes the ability to
waive classwide proceedings in the resolution of future disputes. However,
discretion in structuring arbitration agreements has never been extended to
permit waiver of substantive rights protected by statute. One such
unwaivable substantive right is invocation of classwide proceedings under
Section 7 of the NLRA. Accordingly, refusing to enforce predispute
arbitration agreements that waive this right creates no conflict with the
FAA. As the NLRB correctly held in D.R. Horton, employment arbitration
agreements with class waivers must be declared unenforceable.

